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Hurst v. Florida 
14-7505 
Ruling Below: Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009), cert granted  
Hurst was convicted for the May 2, 1998, first-degree murder of Cynthia Harrison in a robbery at 
the Popeye’s restaurant where Hurst was employed in Escambia County, Florida. Hurst’s 
conviction and death sentence were originally affirmed in Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 
2002). The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court's order denying relief as to the guilt 
phase claims defendant raised. It reversed the trial court's order denying relief as to Hurst’s 
penalty phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in investigation and presentation of 
mental mitigation, vacated his sentence of death, and remanded for a new penalty phase 
proceeding before a jury, which could consider evidence of aggravation and mitigation. 
Question Presented: Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment 
or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona  
 
Timothy Lee HURST 
Appellant 
v. 
STATE of Florida 
Appellee 
Supreme Court of Florida 
Decided on May 1, 2014 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
Per curium 
Timothy Lee Hurst appeals his sentence of 
death that was imposed for the 1998 first-
degree murder of Cynthia Harrison. For the 
reasons set forth below, we affirm his 
sentence. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On the morning of May 2, 1998, a 
murder and robbery occurred at a 
Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in 
Escambia County, Florida, where 
Hurst was employed. Hurst and the 
victim, assistant manager Cynthia 
Lee Harrison, were scheduled to work 
at 8 a.m. on the day of the murder. A 
worker at a nearby restaurant, Carl 
Hess, testified that he saw Harrison 
arriving at work between 7 a.m. and 
8:30 a.m. Afterwards, Hess said that 
he saw a man, who was about six feet 
tall and weighed between 280 and 
300 pounds, arrive at Popeye’s and 
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bang on the glass windows until he 
was let inside. The man was dressed 
in a Popeye’s uniform and Hess 
recognized him as someone he had 
seen working at Popeye’s. Shortly 
after the crime, Hess picked Hurst 
from a photographic lineup as the 
man he had seen banging on the 
windows. Hess was also able to 
identify Hurst at trial. 
On the morning of the murder, a 
Popeye’s delivery truck was making 
the rounds at Popeye’s restaurants in 
the area. Janet Pugh, who worked at 
another Popeye’s, testified she 
telephoned Harrison at 7:55 a.m. to 
tell her that the delivery truck had just 
left and Harrison should expect the 
truck soon. Pugh spoke to the victim 
for four to five minutes and did not 
detect that there was anything wrong 
or hear anyone in the background. 
Pugh was certain of the time because 
she looked at the clock while on the 
phone. 
Popeye’s was scheduled to open at 
10:30 a.m. but Harrison and Hurst 
were the only employees scheduled to 
work at 8 a.m. However, at some 
point before opening, two other 
Popeye’s employees arrived, in 
addition to the driver of the supply 
truck. None of them saw Hurst or his 
car. At 10:30 a.m., another Popeye’s 
assistant manager, Tonya Crenshaw, 
arrived and found the two Popeye’s 
employees and the truck driver 
waiting outside the locked restaurant. 
When Crenshaw unlocked the door, 
and she and the delivery driver 
entered, they discovered that the safe 
was unlocked and open, and the 
previous day’s receipts, as well as 
$375 in small bills and change, were 
missing. The driver discovered the 
victim’s dead body inside the freezer. 
The victim had her hands bound 
behind her back with black electrical 
tape and she also had tape over her 
mouth. Similar tape was later found in 
the trunk of Hurst’s car. The scene 
was covered with a significant 
amount of the victim’s blood, and it 
was apparent from water on the floor 
that someone had attempted to clean 
up the area. The victim suffered a 
minimum of sixty incised slash and 
stab wounds, including severe 
wounds to the face, neck, back, torso, 
and arms. The victim also had blood 
stains on the knees of her pants, 
indicating that she had been kneeling 
in her blood. A forensic pathologist, 
Dr. Michael Berkland, testified that 
some of the wounds cut through the 
tissue into the underlying bone, and 
while several wounds had the 
potential to be fatal, the victim 
probably would not have survived 
more than fifteen minutes after the 
wounds were inflicted. Dr. Berkland 
also testified that the victim’s wounds 
were consistent with the use of a box 
cutter. A box cutter was found on a 
baker’s rack close to the victim’s 
body. Later testing showed that the 
box cutter had the victim’s blood on 
it. It was not the type of box cutter that 
was used at Popeye’s, but was similar 
to a box cutter that Hurst had been 
seen with several days before the 
crime. 
Hurst’s friend, Michael Williams, 
testified that Hurst admitted to him 
that he had killed Harrison. Hurst told 
him that he had an argument with the 
victim, she “retaliated,” and that 
Hurst hit the victim and cut her with a 
box cutter. Hurst said he had killed 
the victim because, “he didn’t want 
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the woman to see his face.” Williams 
stated that Hurst had talked about 
robbing Popeye’s on previous 
occasions. 
Another of Hurst’s friends, “Lee-
Lee” Smith, testified that the night 
before the murder, Hurst said he was 
going to rob Popeye’s. On the 
morning of the murder, Hurst came to 
Smith’s house with a plastic container 
full of money from the Popeye’s safe. 
Hurst instructed Smith to keep the 
money for him. Hurst said he had 
killed the victim and put her in the 
freezer. Smith washed Hurst’s pants, 
which had blood on them, and threw 
away Hurst’s socks and shoes. Later 
that morning, Smith and Hurst went 
to Wal-Mart to purchase a new pair of 
shoes. They also went to a pawn shop 
where Hurst saw some rings he liked, 
and after returning to Smith’s house 
for the stolen money, Hurst returned 
to the shop and purchased the three 
rings for $300. An employee at the 
shop, Bob Little, testified that on the 
day of the murder, a man fitting 
Hurst’s description purchased three 
rings. Little picked Hurst out of a 
photographic lineup as the man who 
had purchased the rings. The police 
recovered the three rings from Hurst. 
Smith’s parents were out of town the 
weekend of the murder but upon their 
return, and after discovering the 
container with the money from 
Popeye’s in Smith’s room, Smith’s 
mother contacted the police and 
turned the container over to them. The 
police interviewed Smith and 
searched a garbage can in Smith’s 
yard where they found a coin purse 
that contained the victim’s driver’s 
license and other property, a bank bag 
marked with “Popeye’s” and the 
victim’s name, a bank deposit slip, a 
sock with blood stains on it, and a 
sheet of notebook paper marked “Lee 
Smith, language lab.” On the back of 
the notebook paper someone had 
added several numbers, and one 
number was the same as the amount 
on the deposit slip. Smith’s father also 
gave the police a pair of size fourteen 
shoes that appeared to have blood 
stains on them and that he had 
retrieved from the same trash can. 
Jack Remus, a Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement (FDLE) crime lab 
analyst, testified that the shoes were 
tested with phenolpthalein to detect 
blood, and while the test results 
exhibited some of the chemical 
indications associated with blood, 
attempts at DNA testing were not 
successful. Remus also tested the 
blood-stained sock and determined 
that the DNA typing was consistent 
with the victim. Hurst’s pants were 
also tested, but no blood evidence was 
detected. FDLE fingerprint expert 
Paul Norkus testified that the deposit 
slip in the garbage can had three of 
Hurst’s fingerprints on it. At trial, the 
State played the tape of an interview 
the police had conducted with Hurst 
shortly after the murder. Hurst said 
that on the morning of the murder he 
was on his way to work and his car 
broke down. He said that he 
telephoned Harrison at Popeye’s to 
say he was unable to come to work, 
and when he talked to her, she 
sounded scared and he heard 
whispering in the background. Hurst 
then went to Smith’s house and 
changed out of his work clothes. 
Hurst said he went to the pawn shop 
and bought necklaces for friends, but 
he did not mention purchasing the 
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three rings or buying a new pair of 
shoes at Wal-Mart. 
At the close of the guilt phase of the 
trial, the jury deliberated for 
approximately six hours before 
finding Hurst guilty of first-degree 
murder.  
Hurst filed his initial, amended 
postconviction proceeding in circuit court. 
On appeal from denial of postconviction 
relief, we affirmed on all but one of his 
postconviction claims. Although we 
concluded that the State should have 
disclosed certain field notes by investigator 
Donald Nesmith, and that the trial court’s 
refusal to perpetuate the testimony of Willie 
Griffin was an abuse of discretion, we 
concluded no prejudice accrued from those 
errors. However, we reversed the denial of 
relief on Hurst’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in investigation and 
presentation of mitigation in the penalty 
phase, and remanded for a new penalty phase 
proceeding. In granting a new penalty phase, 
we explained that there was no sound basis 
for Hurst’s defense counsel to have failed to 
investigate and present evidence of Hurst’s 
borderline intelligence, possible organic 
brain damage, the fact that he was in special 
education classes as a child, and other 
mitigation for which there appeared to be no 
apparent disadvantage in presentation.  
Prior to the new sentencing trial, the trial 
court denied Hurst’s successive motion for an 
evidentiary hearing on mental retardation. In 
addition, the court denied Hurst’s request to 
present mental retardation to the penalty 
phase jury as an absolute bar to 
recommendation of a death sentence, 
although the court allowed him to present 
mental retardation and other mental issues as 
mitigation to the jury. After the new penalty 
phase evidence was presented, in which the 
State presented an abbreviated version of the 
trial testimony as to the circumstances of the 
murder, and after the defense presented 
testimony concerning mitigation, the jury 
returned a recommendation of death by a 
seven-to-five vote. 
Before sentencing, the trial court held a 
Spencer hearing at which defense counsel 
presented further argument that the evidence 
at the penalty phase established that Hurst 
was mentally retarded. The trial court 
subsequently entered a sentencing order 
sentencing Hurst to death. In doing so, the 
court found as aggravating factors that (1) the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or 
cruel, which was assigned great weight; and 
(2) the murder was committed while Hurst 
was engaged in commission of a robbery, 
which was assigned great weight. In 
mitigation, the trial court found the following 
two statutory mitigators: (1) no significant 
history of prior criminal activity, which was 
assigned moderate weight; and (2) Hurst’s 
age of 19 and his young mental age, which 
was assigned moderate weight.  
The trial court found as additional mitigation 
that Hurst had significant mental issues—
limited mental and intellectual capacity with 
widespread abnormalities in his brain 
affecting impulse control and judgment 
consistent with fetal alcohol syndrome, 
which was assigned moderate weight—
although the court expressly found that Hurst 
is not mentally retarded. The trial court 
rejected as unproven proffered mitigating 
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factors that the defendant was under the 
influence of mental or emotional disturbance; 
the defendant was an accomplice with 
relatively minor participation; the defendant 
acted under extreme duress or substantial 
domination of another; or the defendant 
lacked the capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.  
Hurst took a timely appeal from the sentence 
of death raising the following issues: (1) 
whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
give him a separate evidentiary hearing on his 
successive mental retardation claim, in 
refusing to allow the jury to determine mental 
retardation as a bar to execution, and in 
finding after trial that he is not mentally 
retarded and exempt from execution; (2) 
whether this Court should recede from 
precedent holding that the jury need not 
expressly find specific aggravators or issue a 
unanimous advisory verdict on the sentence; 
and (3) whether his death sentence is 
proportionate. We turn to Hurst’s first issue 
on appeal. 
ANALYSIS  
A. Mental Retardation Issues  
The United States Supreme Court held in 
Atkins v. Virginia, that the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution 
forbids execution of mentally retarded 
defendants. However, the Supreme Court left 
it to the states to determine the manner in 
which this constitutional restriction on 
execution of its sentences will be enforced. 
Florida law sets forth a three-pronged test to 
determine mental retardation as a bar to the 
death penalty. In order to prove mental 
retardation as a bar to execution, the 
defendant must prove all three of the 
following factors: (1) significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning, 
which has been interpreted to be a full scale 
IQ of 70 or below on a standardized 
intelligence test; (2) concurrent deficits in 
adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of 
the condition before age eighteen. The 
burden is on the defendant raising a claim of 
mental retardation as a bar to execution to 
prove mental retardation by clear and 
convincing evidence.  
Hurst contends that the trial court erred in 
denying a successive mental retardation 
hearing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.203. He contends that he is 
mentally retarded and exempt from execution 
based on a recent Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition (WAIS-
IV) test that indicated his full scale IQ is 69, 
and based on expert testimony that he 
suffered from adaptive deficits—all before 
age eighteen—such that he met the statutory 
requirements for mental retardation. Hurst 
was previously provided a full evidentiary 
hearing on the question of mental retardation 
in his initial postconviction proceeding. At 
that evidentiary hearing, Hurst presented the 
expert testimony of Dr. Valerie McClain, a 
licensed clinical psychologist, who 
administered a number of tests to Hurst, 
including the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI). That test placed Hurst 
in the borderline range with a full scale IQ 
score of 70. As to deficits in adaptive 
functioning, Dr. McClain testified that in her 
opinion Hurst did not meet the adaptive 
functioning deficit threshold for mental 
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retardation, and she did not determine that 
Hurst is mentally retarded. At that same 
evidentiary hearing, the State presented 
clinical psychologist Dr. James D. Larsen. 
After testing Hurst with the WAIS-III test, 
Dr. Larsen concluded that Hurst’s full scale 
IQ was 78. Dr. Larsen also found no deficits 
in adaptive functioning necessary for a 
diagnosis of mental retardation. The circuit 
court in that initial postconviction proceeding 
denied the mental retardation claim, relying 
primarily on the testimony of Dr. McClain 
and Dr. Larsen that Hurst’s adaptive behavior 
was not substantially impaired; however, no 
appeal was taken of that ruling when it was 
denied in 2007. 
In this case, Hurst contends that the trial court 
should have held a second Atkins mental 
retardation hearing prior to the new 
sentencing trial. The trial court denied the 
request for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on 
several grounds, one of which was that the 
motion was untimely under the requirements 
of rule 3.203. We conclude that denial of the 
request for a second Atkins hearing was not 
an abuse of discretion under the 
circumstances present in this case. Moreover, 
any error in denying the pretrial evidentiary 
hearing on mental retardation was harmless 
because Hurst was allowed to present all his 
mental retardation evidence at the penalty 
phase, after which the trial court ruled that he 
failed to establish that he is mentally 
retarded. The background and mental 
mitigation evidence presented by Hurst at the 
penalty phase is discussed next. 
Hurt’s sister, Sequester “Tina” Hurst; 
brother, Jermaine Bradley; mother, Bertha 
Bradley; father, Timothy Bradley; Bible 
study teacher, Isaac Sheppard; administrator 
at Hurst’s high school, Calvin Harris; and 
former United States Army Major and 
principal of East Charter School, Jerome 
Chism, all testified concerning Hurst’s 
family and background. Hurst’s mother was 
age fifteen when Hurst was born and, during 
pregnancy, she drank all day, every day.  
As a child Hurst stuttered and developed very 
slowly. As a toddler, he was slow to learn to 
walk. He was disciplined harshly when he 
was growing up and was punished more than 
the other children because he could not do 
things correctly.  
Hurst was a fun-loving child and teenager 
with a good personality. He liked to play 
jokes and was mild tempered, but was slow 
mentally and did very poorly in school. In 
Bible study classes as a child, Hurst was 
unable to progress out of the most basic 
children’s Bible study book and could not 
look up the Bible verses that went with the 
stories. He was embarrassed because he had 
difficulty reading. Hurst should have been in 
special education classes because he was low 
functioning and could not understand what 
was going on in class; and for that reason, he 
would skip class and play basketball in the 
gym. Even though his school wanted to place 
Hurst in a special education program, his 
mother objected because she was afraid he 
would be picked on. He did go to East Charter 
School, which taught low achievers and 
children with behavioral problems, and while 
there, was teased about his large size and his 
slowness. His maturity level remained very 
low and even at age eighteen, he exhibited the 
maturity of a middle-school student. Hurst 
could not obtain a GED, but did have a 
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driver’s license and obtained a car with his 
father’s help, although he was a poor driver. 
Family members testified that Hurst had to be 
reminded to take care of himself; and he 
allowed his mother and sister to wash his 
clothes, and allowed his mother to cook for 
him. He had poor hygiene and had to be 
reminded to bathe and dress appropriately. 
He had to be reminded to keep appointments 
and be awakened for work. Hurst did not 
have a checking account and would likely 
have had difficulty making change if he was 
working a cash register. However, Hurst was 
employed at Popeye’s and did food “prep 
work.”  
Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist, professor of 
psychiatry, and clinical director of the 
University of California at Irvine College of 
Medicine Brain Imaging Center, testified as 
an expert on the use of positron emission 
tomography (PET) in regard to neurological 
and psychiatric disorders. He was present 
when a PET scan was performed on Hurst 
and later interpreted the results of that PET 
scan. Dr. Wu testified that the scan showed a 
decreased cortical cerebellum metabolic rate, 
which indicated widespread damage to the 
cortical region of Hurst’s brain. He opined 
that Hurst has widespread abnormalities in 
multiple areas of his brain, which 
abnormalities are associated with lack of 
judgment, risk taking, impulsivity, and 
immaturity. Dr. Wu was aware that it was 
reported Hurst suffered from fetal alcohol 
syndrome, which, along with other trauma, 
can cause the types of problems seen in 
Hurst’s PET scan, although he could not say 
from the PET scan what caused the 
abnormalities in Hurst’s brain. 
Dr. Harry Krop, a clinical and forensic 
psychologist, testified that he administered 
the WAIS-IV test, as well as a test of memory 
malingering (TOMM), to Hurst in January 
and February 2012. The testing resulted in a 
full scale IQ of 69, which is in the range of 
mental retardation. Dr. Krop reviewed details 
of the murder, Hurst’s regular school records, 
the charter school records, Florida 
Department of Corrections records, tests and 
reports of other testing performed on Hurst, 
and Dr. Wu’s PET scan report. He also spoke 
to various family members for the purpose of 
evaluating Hurst’s adaptive functioning as 
measured by completion of the Adaptive 
Behavior Assessment System (ABAS). He 
did not listen to the recorded statement Hurst 
gave to police. After reviewing the 
questionnaire for the ABAS, which was 
completed by Hurst and three family 
members, Dr. Krop concluded that Hurst is 
significantly deficient in all areas of adaptive 
functioning. Dr. Krop was aware of earlier 
testing in which Hurst scored in the 78 IQ 
range on a different WAIS test, which Dr. 
Krop opined was not as accurate as the newer 
WAIS-IV, and his final opinion was that 
Hurst is mentally retarded. 
Dr. Gordon Taub, psychologist and associate 
professor at the University of Central Florida 
specializing in measurement of intelligence, 
structure of intelligence, intelligence theory, 
and evaluation of intelligence tests, testified 
that he has written articles about the 
Wechsler Scale of Intelligence tests. He 
testified that the WAIS-IV, which was 
revised in 2008, now measures four areas of 
intelligence, made changes in the subtests, 
and added some completely new tests. Dr. 
Taub was aware that Hurst received a full 
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scale IQ score of 78 on the earlier WAIS-III 
test in 2004, which he said tested for only two 
main factors. He agreed that on the WAIS-IV 
test, which was given by Dr. Krop and which 
tests for four main factors, Hurst received a 
full scale score of 69. Dr. Taub opined that 
scores on the current WAIS-IV and earlier 
Wechsler tests cannot properly be compared 
because of the changes to the newer test and 
because the WAIS-IV is a much better test. 
However, Dr. Taub agreed that the WAIS-III 
is a “valid score of intelligence and there’s no 
reason not to use that score if you attained it 
at the time that it was the test to use to 
measure intelligence.”  
Dr. Taub testified that other testing done on 
Hurst when he was under the age of eighteen 
and still in school showed depressed scores. 
As to Hurst’s adaptive functioning, Dr. Taub 
testified that the information gathered by Dr. 
Krop showed Hurst was impaired in 
functioning in the real world in areas of self-
care and in communication. Dr. Taub 
administered the Woodcock Johnson Test of 
Achievement, Third Edition, to Hurst, which 
tests areas in reading, writing, math, and 
spelling. He opined that Hurst’s limited 
proficiency shown on the achievement test is 
consistent with his school records showing 
low performance. He concluded based on the 
WAIS-IV test and on information concerning 
Hurst’s adaptive functioning, school records, 
and achievement testing, that Hurst meets the 
legal criteria for mental retardation in 
Florida. 
The State presented the testimony of Dr. 
Harry McClaren, forensic psychologist, who 
testified that he reviewed court documents, 
the testimony of Hurst’s family members, the 
testimony of Drs. McClain and Larson at the 
prior evidentiary hearing, mental health 
records from the Department of Corrections, 
educational records and school test results, 
information about the crime, Hurst’s 
statement to police, and the testimony of Drs. 
Taub and Krop. Dr. McClaren also reviewed 
a WAIS-III test given to Hurst by a Dr. 
Riebsame in 2003 and the WASI (Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence) given by 
Dr. McClain in 2004. He testified that it 
would be a mistake to ignore Hurst’s past 
testing with the WAIS-III resulting in full 
scale IQ scores of 76 and 78 because that test 
was the state of the art instrument at the time. 
Dr. McClaren also testified that there was no 
adaptive behavior testing done when Hurst 
was young, and now the reports of his deficits 
are anecdotal. He opined that Hurst does not 
meet the criteria for mental retardation. 
The trial court relied primarily on the 
testimony of Dr. McClaren and on evidence 
of Hurst’s actions in and around the time of 
the crime in determining that Hurst did not 
meet the test for mental retardation as a bar to 
the death penalty. In addition to testimony of 
members of law enforcement who 
investigated the crime and recovered 
evidence from Lee-Lee Smith’s house, the 
State presented Hurst’s statement given to 
detectives at the time. After Hurst signed a 
waiver of his rights and agreed he was 
speaking voluntarily with the detectives, he 
gave a narrative of what he said he did that 
morning in which he described going to a 
friend’s house to unsuccessfully try to use the 
telephone because, he said, his car broke 
down. He gave street directions to that 
friend’s house. Hurst said he then went to the 
E-Z Serve to use the pay telephone to call 
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Popeye’s and tell Cynthia Harrison he would 
not be able to come into work. He said that 
she spoke “in a scary voice” with a “scary 
tone,” and he could hear some whispering in 
the background. He recited the telephone 
number that he called to talk with her. Hurst 
also related to detectives that he went to Lee-
Lee Smith’s house that morning, and then to 
his own house where his brother Jermaine 
asked Hurst to take him to a pawn shop. Hurst 
described putting something in his car to 
clean out the gas tank and then driving to the 
pawn shop with Jermaine, Lee-Lee, and 
another young man. Hurst said in his 
statement that he bought his brother two 
necklaces at the pawn shop with his brother’s 
money. Hurst told detectives that after 
leaving Lee-Lee Smith’s house and before 
going to the pawn shop, he changed his shirt 
and shoes but not his work pants. Timothy 
Bradley, Hurst’s biological father, testified 
that on the morning of May 2, 1998, at around 
7:45 a.m., he saw Hurst putting the battery 
back into his car after the battery had been on 
the charger all night. At that time, Hurst was 
wearing his Popeye’s uniform. 
The trial court concluded in the sentencing 
order that Hurst was able to maintain a job 
and had acquired a driver’s license. The court 
noted that Hurst’s statement to police and his 
efforts to conceal his involvement in the 
crime were particularly persuasive in 
determining that Hurst did not suffer 
significant deficits in adaptive functioning. 
The court stated, “The statement, given 
shortly after the crime, reveals an individual 
clearly recounting a morning’s events, giving 
directions, recalling telephone numbers, and 
deliberately omitting certain information 
tending to incriminate him. Similarly, the 
evidence offered at trial suggests that 
Defendant took numerous steps to conceal 
his involvement in the crime by attempting to 
clean the murder scene, having his clothes 
washed, hiding the money in another 
location, discarding Ms. Harrison’s 
belongings and his shoes, and buying new 
shoes.” We also note that evidence that Hurst 
was a nineteen-year-old who still lived at 
home and allowed his mother and sister to 
cook for him and do his laundry does not 
establish that he is unable to care for himself. 
Because the trial court had before it 
competent, substantial evidence to support its 
conclusion that Hurst is not mentally retarded 
under the three-prong test set forth in Florida 
law, we find no error in this ruling. 
Although Hurst was allowed to present all his 
mental retardation and other mental 
mitigation to the jury, he also contends that 
the trial court erred in refusing to submit the 
question of mental retardation as a bar to the 
death penalty to the jury for its determination. 
This claim lacks merit. We have repeatedly 
held that a defendant has no right under 
Atkins to a jury determination of whether he 
is mentally retarded. Florida is not one of 
those states, and the United States Supreme 
Court has not mandated any specific 
procedure for making the determination of 
mental retardation in the capital sentencing 
context. Thus, the trial court did not err in 
refusing to submit to the jury the question of 
Hurst’s mental retardation as a bar to the 
death penalty in this case.  
B. Lack of Jury Findings as to Specific 
Aggravators and Lack of a Unanimous 
Advisory Verdict on the Sentence 
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Hurst next contends that constitutional error 
occurred in his case because the advisory jury 
in the penalty phase was not required to find 
specific facts as to the aggravating factors, 
and that the jury was not required to make a 
unanimous recommendation as to the 
sentence. In this case, the jury voted seven to 
five to recommend a death sentence be 
imposed. Hurst bases his claims on the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ring, which held that capital defendants are 
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on 
which the legislature conditions an increase 
in the maximum punishment. Hurst 
recognizes that our precedent has repeatedly 
held that Ring does not require the jury to 
make specific findings of the aggravators or 
to make a unanimous jury recommendation 
as to sentence, and he asks us to revisit our 
precedent on the issue in the decisions in 
Bottoson v. Moore and King v. Moore. In the 
plurality decisions in both cases, we rejected 
claims that Ring applied to Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme. We decline to revisit 
those decisions in this case. 
Hurst contends that the facts of this case 
support a conclusion that Ring applies to 
require the jury to expressly find one or more 
aggravators and to issue its recommendation 
based on a unanimous advisory verdict. He 
contends that this case is distinguishable 
from cases where a jury has unanimously 
found an aggravating factor such as 
conviction of a prior violent felony or that the 
murder was committed in the course of 
committing, attempting to commit, or flight 
after commission of a separate enumerated 
felony. There is no prior violent felony 
aggravator in this case, nor did this jury 
convict Hurst of a contemporaneous felony 
such as robbery. However, we have rejected 
the Ring claim in similarly situated cases. 
We previously rejected the invitation to 
revisit our decisions in Bottoson and King in 
Peterson v. State, a case which also did not 
involve conviction for a prior violent felony 
or a contemporaneous enumerated felony, 
and did not involve a unanimous jury 
advisory verdict. There, the majority stated, 
“We have consistently rejected claims that 
Florida’s death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional.” Similarly, in Butler v. 
State, this Court rejected the Ring claim 
where there was no aggravating factor based 
on a prior violent felony conviction and there 
was no unanimous jury advisory sentence. 
We continue to adhere to this same body of 
precedent. 
We also note that the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Evans v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t. 
of Corrections, reversed a federal district 
court’s ruling that Florida’s sentencing 
scheme violates Ring. The Eleventh Circuit 
noted that the United States Supreme Court’s 
“last word in a Florida capital case on the 
constitutionality of that state’s death 
sentencing procedures” came in Hildwin v. 
Florida, which predated Ring. Evans. This 
Court, in Hildwin v. State, rejected the claim 
that the sentencing scheme was 
unconstitutional because the jury is not 
required to make specific findings 
authorizing the imposition of the death 
penalty. On review, the United States 
Supreme Court affirmed our decision in 
Hildwin and stated, “[T]he Sixth Amendment 
does not require that the specific findings 
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of 
death be made by the jury.” As the Eleventh 
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Circuit noted in Evans, the United States 
Supreme Court has never expressly overruled 
Hildwin, and did not do so in Ring. The Evans 
court also agreed with the State that Florida’s 
sentencing procedures do provide for jury 
input about the existence of aggravating 
factors prior to sentencing—a process that 
was completely lacking in the Arizona statute 
struck down in Ring. For all these reasons, we 
reject Hurst’s claim that Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under 
Ring.  
C. Proportionality  
Hurst next contends that the death sentence in 
this case is not proportional because it is not 
one of the most aggravated and least 
mitigated of first-degree murders, thus 
requiring that his death sentence be reduced 
to life in prison. He contends that a life 
sentence should be imposed based on 
evidence of abnormalities in his brain due to 
fetal alcohol syndrome, his low mental 
functioning, and other mental and 
background mitigation. In performing the 
proportionality review, this Court has 
explained: 
“[W]e make a comprehensive 
analysis in order to determine 
whether the crime falls within the 
category of both the most aggravated 
and the least mitigated of murders, 
thereby assuring uniformity in the 
application of the sentence.” We 
consider the totality of the 
circumstances of the case and 
compare the case to other capital 
cases. This entails “a qualitative 
review by this Court of the underlying 
basis for each aggravator and 
mitigator rather than a quantitative 
analysis.” In other words, 
proportionality review “is not a 
comparison between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.” 
This Court has long recognized an obligation 
to perform a proportionality review. 
In reviewing proportionality, this Court 
follows precedent that requires that the death 
penalty be “reserved only for those cases 
where the most aggravating and least 
mitigating circumstances exist.” In doing so, 
we “will not disturb the sentencing judge’s 
determination as to ‘the relative weight to 
give to each established mitigator’ where that 
ruling is ‘supported by competent, substantial 
evidence in the record.’” We “review the 
weight the trial court ascribes to mitigating 
factors under the abuse of discretion 
standard.” The Court will also “affirm the 
weight given an aggravator if based on 
competent substantial evidence.” “The 
weight to be given aggravating factors is 
within the discretion of the trial court, and it 
is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.” 
Hurst contends, inter alia, that his case is 
similar to Cooper v. State, in which the Court 
vacated the death sentence and imposed a life 
sentence on the basis of lack of 
proportionality when compared to other 
capital cases. In Cooper, the evidence 
showed the defendant was eighteen years old 
at the time of the crime. Cooper also suffered 
from borderline mental retardation, brain 
damage likely caused by beatings and head 
trauma as a child, a history of seizures, 
schizophrenia, cognitive brain impairment, 
and an abusive childhood including being 
repeatedly threatened with a gun by his 
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father. The trial court in Cooper found three 
aggravators and two statutory mitigators, as 
well as other nonstatutory mitigation. We 
conclude that although there was more 
aggravation in Cooper, there was also more 
mitigation than is present in this case. Cooper 
does not require us to find Hurst’s sentence 
disproportionate. 
The State relies on Jeffries v. State, as a basis 
on which to find the sentence in this case 
proportional. In Jeffries, the murder occurred 
in a somewhat similar manner to the instant 
case—the victim was stabbed, suffering 
multiple sharp force injuries, and was beaten. 
The trial court found two aggravators, murder 
in course of commission of a robbery and 
HAC. The mitigation included findings that 
the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct was impaired, that 
the codefendant was equally culpable and 
received a plea deal for a twenty-year 
sentence, and that Jeffries had a long history 
of emotional and mental problems, as well as 
drug and alcohol abuse. We held that the 
death sentence in Jeffries was proportional 
when compared to other capital cases.  
More recently, in Allen v. State, we found the 
death sentence proportionate. The victim was 
bound and had chemicals poured on her face. 
Allen beat the victim with belts, put a belt 
around her neck and, in spite of her pleas to 
stop, strangled her. The autopsy also revealed 
facial bruising, bruising on the torso, hand, 
thigh, knee, and shoulder; and the victim had 
contusions on her hands, face, and torso. Her 
hands showed ligature marks from having 
been tied, and her neck showed signs of 
ligature. 
The trial court in Allen found two 
aggravators—commission of the murder in 
the course of committing or attempting to 
commit a kidnapping, and that the murder 
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
The nonstatutory mitigation found by the 
court included that Allen had been the victim 
of physical and possibly sexual abuse, had 
brain damage due to numerous prior head 
injuries resulting in lack of impulse control, 
suffered a poor childhood environment, and 
exhibited helpfulness. The evidence also 
showed that Allen had significant organic 
brain damage and intracranial injuries, and 
was at the lower end of intellectual capacity. 
Testimony was received that a PET scan 
revealed at least ten brain injuries, mostly to 
the right side of Allen’s brain which would 
affect impulse control, judgment, and mood, 
and would make it hard for her to conform 
her conduct to the requirements of society. 
We found the death sentence in Allen 
proportionate when compared to sentences in 
other capital cases.  
Similarly, in Rogers v. State, the victim was 
murdered by being brutally stabbed, and had 
bruises, abrasions, and a shallow defensive 
wound to her arm. The trial court found two 
aggravators—that the murder was committed 
for pecuniary gain and that it was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The court found 
one statutory mitigator—that the defendant’s 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially 
impaired. This last mitigating factor was 
based on the trial court’s finding that Rogers 
suffers from psychosis and brain damage that 
may have been exacerbated by long-term 
alcohol abuse. The trial court found other 
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mitigation in Rogers’ difficult family 
background, abusive childhood, and his 
exhibition of good qualities as a father and 
employee. We upheld the death sentence in 
Rogers as proportionate.  
Based on the forgoing, we find that Hurst’s 
death sentence, when compared to the death 
sentences in other comparable capital cases, 
is proportionate.  
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm 
Hurst’s sentence of death for the first-degree 
murder of Cynthia Harrison. 
It is so ordered.  
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and 
CANADY, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., 
concurs in part and dissents in part with an 
opinion, in which LABARGA and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME 
EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 
MOTION, AND IF FILED, 
DETERMINED.  
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.  
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Hurst a successive mental 
retardation hearing pursuant to Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.203 prior to the new 
sentencing proceeding. I dissent, however, 
from the majority’s affirmance of Hurst’s 
sentence of death because there was no 
unanimous jury finding of either of the two 
aggravating circumstances found by the trial 
judge—that the murder was heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel; and that the murder was 
committed in the course of a robbery. 
No jury ever convicted Hurst of the 
contemporaneous robbery, so this case does 
not fall within the exception to the 
constitutional requirement of juror unanimity 
for a contemporaneous felony conviction or a 
prior violent felony conviction as an 
aggravating circumstance, which 
automatically demonstrate that the jury has 
made the necessary findings to warrant the 
possibility of a death sentence.  
In Hurst’s case, the jury recommended death 
by the slimmest margin permitted under 
Florida law—a bare majority seven-to-five 
vote. Because a penalty-phase jury in Florida 
is not required to make specific factual 
findings as to the aggravating circumstances 
necessary to impose the death penalty 
pursuant to Florida’s capital sentencing 
statute, it is actually possible that there was 
not even a majority of jurors who agreed that 
the same aggravator applied. In my view, 
Hurst’s death sentence cannot be 
constitutionally imposed, consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ring v. Arizona, and Florida’s right to trial by 
jury, in the absence of a unanimous finding 
by the jury that any of the applicable 
aggravators apply, which is not present here. 
I have previously expressed my view that 
“[t]he absence of a requirement of a 
unanimous jury finding as a precondition to a 
sentence of death is . . . a matter of 
constitutional significance.” Indeed, I 
continue to believe that, in light of Ring, 
Florida’s death penalty statute, as applied in 
circumstances like those presented in this 
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case where there is no unanimous jury 
finding as to any of the aggravating 
circumstances, is unconstitutional.  
As I stated in my opinion dissenting as to the 
affirmance of the death sentence in Peterson:  
“Under our current sentencing 
scheme, not all defendants who are 
convicted of first-degree murder are 
eligible for a sentence of death. The 
trial judge must make additional 
findings before the death penalty can 
be imposed. Without these findings, a 
trial court cannot impose a higher 
sentence than life imprisonment on 
the basis of the verdict alone. It is 
only after a sentencing hearing and 
additional findings of fact regarding 
aggravators and mitigators that the 
sentence of death may be imposed. 
Not only is this requirement imposed 
by Florida law, but it is 
constitutionally mandated by the 
Eighth Amendment to prevent death 
sentences from being arbitrarily 
imposed.  
In addition, as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Ring, 
the Sixth Amendment requires that a 
jury find those aggravating factors. 
As Justice Scalia explained in his 
concurring opinion in Ring, the 
bottom line is that “the fundamental 
meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of 
the Sixth Amendment is that all facts 
essential to imposition of the level of 
punishment that the defendant 
receives—whether the statute calls 
them elements of the offense, 
sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—
must be found by a jury.”  
“Apart from capital sentencing, the 
requirement of unanimity has been 
scrupulously honored in the criminal law of 
this state for any finding of guilt and for any 
fact that increases the maximum 
punishment.” “Florida’s exclusion of the 
death penalty from the requirement of jury 
unanimity cannot be reconciled” with the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Ring that “[t]he 
right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment would be senselessly 
diminished if it encompassed the factfinding 
necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence 
by two years, but not the factfinding 
necessary to put him to death,” and that “the 
Sixth Amendment applies to both.”  
It remains my view that Ring requires any 
fact that qualifies a capital defendant for a 
sentence of death to be found by a jury, and 
that Florida’s state constitutional right to trial 
by jury, which is embodied in article I, 
section 22, of the Florida Constitution, 
“requires a unanimous jury finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt on the existence of any 
element necessary to increase an authorized 
punishment, most especially the ultimate 
punishment of the death penalty.” In other 
words, article I, section 22, is violated in the 
rare case where the death penalty is imposed 
without any of the aggravators that 
automatically demonstrate that a jury has 
made the necessary findings to warrant the 
possibility of a death sentence, such as a prior 
violent felony conviction or that the murder 
occurred while in the course of an 
enumerated felony that was also found by a 
jury. This is one of those rare cases.  
This case also illustrates how the use of a 
special verdict form would help solve the 
problem, as Hurst’s counsel requested an 
interrogatory verdict to specify the 
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aggravators found by the jury and the votes 
on each, but the motion was denied in 
accordance with this Court’s case law 
preventing the use of penalty-phase special 
verdict forms detailing the jurors’ 
determination concerning aggravating 
factors. Had the jury been permitted to 
specify its findings, it is possible that this 
Court would have evidence in the record that 
Hurst’s jury unanimously found the existence 
of one of the aggravators found by the trial 
judge in imposing the death sentence, thereby 
curing the constitutional infirmity in this 
case. Because the jury was not permitted to 
indicate its findings, however, this evidence 
does not appear in our record. 
I have previously expressed my view as to the 
“difficulties created” by this Court’s 
decisions that fail to allow or mandate the use 
of special interrogatories in death penalty 
cases to permit the jury to make special 
findings as to the aggravators. I once again 
renew this position here, as the use of a 
special verdict form during the penalty phase 
would enable this Court “to tell when a jury 
has unanimously found a death-qualifying 
aggravating circumstance, which would both 
facilitate our proportionality review and 
satisfy the constitutional guarantee of trial by 
jury even when the recommendation of death 
is less than unanimous.”  
Finally, I also take this opportunity to note an 
evolving concern as to the possible Eighth 
Amendment implications of Florida’s outlier 
status, among those decreasing number of 
states that still retain the death penalty, on the 
issue of jury unanimity in death penalty 
cases. Except for Florida, every state that 
imposes the death penalty, as well as the 
federal system, requires a unanimous jury 
verdict as to the finding of an aggravating 
circumstance. This means that in no other 
state or federal court in the country would 
Hurst have been sentenced to death in this 
case in the absence of a unanimous jury 
finding of an aggravating circumstance. 
Florida is a clear outlier. 
In Steele, this Court urged the Legislature to 
reexamine Florida’s capital sentencing 
statute in light of Ring and Florida’s outlier 
status. I have also previously echoed this 
suggestion, encouraging the Legislature to 
bring Florida “closer to the mainstream of 
capital sentencing states in regard to jury 
findings.”  
Although those calls for legislative action 
have arisen primarily due to Ring and Sixth 
Amendment concerns, the Eighth 
Amendment ramifications of Florida’s 
outlier status are also clear. For example, two 
Justices on the United States Supreme Court 
have recently expressed “deep concerns” 
about the federal constitutionality of 
Alabama’s death penalty statute in light of its 
outlier status on the issue of jury overrides. 
The United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly explained that “death is different” 
from every other form of punishment. The 
Supreme Court has also emphasized the 
“heightened reliability demanded by the 
Eighth Amendment in the determination 
whether the death penalty is appropriate in a 
particular case.” As this Court has pointed 
out, “[m]any courts and scholars have 
recognized the value of unanimous verdicts,” 
particularly given that the “reliability” of 
death sentences “depends on adhering to 
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guided procedures that promote a reasoned 
judgment by the trier of fact.” While 
questions of public policy regarding Florida’s 
capital sentencing statute are left to the 
Legislature, the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendment implications of Florida’s outlier 
status on the lack of jury unanimity, which 
threaten to unravel our entire death penalty 
scheme, should be of serious concern. I once 
again urge the Legislature, as has former 
Justice Cantero, to revisit this issue in 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. 
For all these reasons, I dissent from the 
majority’s affirmance of Hurst’s death 
sentence because there is no unanimous 
finding by the jury that any of the applicable 
aggravators apply. The absence of juror 
unanimity in the fact-finding necessary to 
impose the death penalty remains, in my 
view, an independent violation of Florida’s 
constitutional right to trial by jury.  
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
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“Supreme Court to Review Florida’s Capital Punishment System” 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jess Bravin 
March 9, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
review whether Florida’s capital punishment 
system too easily allows juries to recommend 
the execution of criminals.  
 
Florida permits executions based on divided 
jury votes and doesn’t require a jury to make 
specific findings regarding the aggravating 
factors that can justify death. The high court 
is to decide whether those practices violate of 
the U.S. Constitution. Alabama is the only 
other state that allows a divided jury vote for 
the death penalty.  
 
The case involves Timothy Hurst, 36, who 
was convicted of the 1998 murder of his 
manager, Cynthia Harrison, while robbing 
the Popeye’s fast-food restaurant where he 
worked. He was sentenced to death by the 
jury’s 7-5 vote. Among other issues, Mr. 
Hurst’s appeal to the Supreme Court argued 
Florida didn’t adequately consider his claims 
of intellectual disability, and that the jury rule 
allowing a divided vote was unconstitutional.  
 
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Mr. 
Hurst’s death sentence, ruling the state’s 
sentencing system wasn’t subject to Ring v. 
Arizona, a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
requiring that jurors, rather than a judge 
acting alone, determine whether aggravating 
factors justified executing a defendant.  
 
The Ring decision “says a jury has to make a 
unanimous determination regarding any 
factor in a criminal trial that has the effect of 
increasing the maximum sentence,” said 
Evan Mandery, an expert in capital 
punishment at the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice. “On the face, it would seem 
that would apply to a death-penalty case,” but 
no specific ruling of the high court has found 
the precedent invalidates the Florida system, 
he said.  
 
The Florida attorney general’s office 
declined to comment beyond its legal brief. 
In its brief opposing Mr. Hurst’s petition, the 
state argued its sentencing procedures were 
adequate. Trial rules “do provide jury input 
about the existence of aggravating 
circumstances that was lacking in the 
Arizona procedures that the court struck 
down in Ring,” the state said.  
 
The Florida Supreme Court has suggested the 
state legislature tighten requirements for 
death sentences, including requiring 
unanimous jury recommendations. 
Bipartisan legislation to make those changes 
is going before a state Senate committee on 
Tuesday.  
 
“The specter of having our sentencing 
scheme invalidated is what motivates those 
of us seeking to reform our laws—and those 
odds just increased,” said state Rep. José 
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Javier Rodriguez, a Miami Democrat who 
introduced a sentencing bill in December.  
 
A separate U.S. Supreme Court decision 
from 2002 found it unconstitutional to 
execute intellectually disabled defendants, 
but gave the states leeway in complying with 
the ruling. Last year, the justices found 
Florida’s method—a rigid cutoff of a 70 IQ 
score—insufficient, instead requiring that 
those with scores in that range be allowed to 
introduce additional evidence speaking to 
their mental capacity.  
 
Only Florida and Alabama permit death 
sentences without a unanimous jury 
recommendation—with Florida requiring a 
simple majority and Alabama requiring at 
least a 10-2 vote, Mr. Hurst’s petition said.  
 
Florida has executed 90 convicts since the 
death penalty was reinstated in 1976, the 
fourth highest number among the states, and 
Alabama has executed 56, ranking sixth, 
according to the Death Penalty Information 
Center.  
 
Alabama also permits judges to impose the 
death penalty despite a jury’s 
recommendation for a life sentence, a 
practice the Supreme Court upheld in 1995. 
Two years ago, the court declined an 
opportunity to revisit the issue, over the 
dissent of Justices Sonia Sotomayor and 
Stephen Breyer. New petitions raising that 
issue currently are pending before the court. 
Florida and Delaware also permit a judge to 
override a jury, but that hasn’t happened for 
at least 15 years, Mr. Mandery said.  
 
The Hurst case will be heard in the high 
court’s next term, which begins in October. 
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“Florida’s Death Row Could See Vacancies if Supreme Court Rules 
Juries Must be Unanimous” 
The Florida Times Union 
Larry Hannan 
April 25, 2015 
 
Very few people in Jacksonville have heard 
of Timothy Hurst. But the Panhandle man 
may soon be responsible for getting dozens 
of people from the Jacksonville area off 
Death Row. 
The scenario could happen because of the 
way Florida sentences convicted killers to 
death. Hurst, 36 and on Death Row for killing 
an Escambia County fast-food manager, 
claims his death sentence violates the Sixth 
Amendment because only seven of his 12 
jurors recommended he get the death penalty. 
The other five said he should get life without 
the possibility of parole. 
Florida, Delaware and Alabama are the only 
states that don’t require juries in death-
penalty cases to reach a unanimous decision 
when sentencing someone to death. In 
Florida a jury must unanimously vote to 
convict someone of first-degree murder and 
then decides whether to recommend death 
after a separate sentencing hearing. 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider 
Hurst’s case. Oral arguments are expected to 
occur this year with a ruling likely in the 
spring of 2016. 
Jacksonville-area Public Defender Matt 
Shirk said he believes in the death penalty, 
but not the way Florida practices it. He hopes 
the Supreme Court throws out Hurst’s death 
sentence. 
“In this state we’re just getting it wrong when 
we don’t require a unanimous jury verdict,” 
Shirk said. 
Seventy-five people are on Death Row for 
murders committed in Duval, Clay, Nassau, 
Putnam or St. Johns counties. Only 13 got 
sentenced to death after a jury unanimously 
recommended it. 
That means 62 people on Death Row from 
Northeast Florida could have their death 
sentences thrown out if the Supreme Court 
rules in Hurst’s favor. People who could be 
impacted include Rasheem Dubose, 
convicted of the murder of 8-year-old 
Dreshawna Davis; Paul Durousseau for the 
murder of Tyresa Mack; and Alan Wade, 
Tiffany Cole and Michael James Jackson for 
the robbery, kidnapping and murders of Carol 
and Reggie Sumner. 
RING VS. ARIZONA 
Ronald Clark, 47, knows Hurst very well. 
Hurst lives down the hall from him on 
Florida’s Death Row. There since 1991 for 
the murder of Ronald Willis in Jacksonville, 
Clark sees Hurst as perhaps his best chance 
to die of natural causes. The jury that 
convicted Clark recommended death on an 
11-1 vote. 
“I think this case is way overdue,” Clark said 
in a letter to the Times-Union. “Florida, in 
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ignoring the courts ruling in Ring vs. Arizona 
basically was slapping the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the face, saying it’s our way or the 
highway, we run things down here in the dirty 
South, not you do-gooders in Washington.” 
Richard Dieter, executive director of the 
Death Penalty Information Network, said 
death-penalty opponents have been waiting a 
long time for a case like Hurst’s. In fact 
they’ve been waiting since 2002. 
That was the year the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in Ring vs. Arizona that a jury — not a 
judge — must make the factual findings 
required to sentence someone to death. 
The 7-2 majority opinion, written by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said juries must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt each factor 
considered in determining whether a death 
sentence should be imposed. 
To involve jurors any less, she said, violated 
defendants’ Sixth-Amendment right to a trial 
by jury. 
“We all took note of Ring when it was 
decided,” said former Jacksonville Public 
Defender Bill White. “It was obvious that 
without a unanimous jury recommendation 
there were going to be Sixth Amendment 
issues in Florida.” 
The ruling essentially invalidated Arizona’s 
death-penalty law, which had trial judges 
decide whether someone should be sentenced 
to death with no jury feedback. Dieter said it 
also should have invalidated Florida’s death-
penalty law because the court ruling required 
the jury to decide if someone should be 
sentenced to death. 
“Florida does not allow for such a 
determination,” Dieter said. “Instead, the jury 
makes only an advisory recommendation to 
the judge that aggravating factors exist [thus 
indicating eligibility for the death penalty] 
and that the person should be sentenced to life 
or death.” 
The factual determination of death-penalty 
eligibility is left to the judge, not the jury, and 
that violates the Sixth Amendment as 
interpreted in Ring, Dieter said. 
But in 2005 the Florida Supreme Court ruled 
it did not violate the Constitution. However, 
in his majority opinion upholding the law, 
Supreme Court Justice Raoul Cantero called 
on the Legislature to revisit Florida’s death-
penalty statute to require unanimity for jury 
recommendations of death. 
Nothing happened. Legislation was 
introduced multiple times, but it has never 
come close to passing. 
“The Legislature seems scared to do anything 
that will make them seem soft on crime,” 
White said. 
Jacksonville lawyer Frank Tassone defended 
death-penalty clients for decades at trials and 
appeals. He thinks there’s a good chance the 
Supreme Court rules in favor of Hurst. 
“Common sense says that the Supreme Court 
isn’t going to issue a ruling that lets 
thousands of people out of prison,” Tassone 
said. “But they may be willing to do this.” 
No one would get out of prison; it would just 
mean some people would get off Death Row 
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and get sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole, he said. 
The Hurst case is a strong appeal because the 
jury recommended death on a 7-5 vote and he 
had no previous criminal record, said 
Gainesville-area Chief Assistant Public 
Defender Al Chipperfield, who previously 
defended death-penalty clients as an assistant 
public defender in Jacksonville. 
“It’s possible the Supreme Court has been 
waiting for the right case,” Chipperfield said. 
“And this is it.” 
AN UNEXPECTED EMOTION 
Even when his son’s killer got the death 
penalty, Glen Mitchell was pretty certain he 
would never be executed. 
“I had done research and saw that other 
murders much worse than what happened to 
Jeff had been overturned,” Mitchell said. “So 
even during the trial I thought the death 
penalty wouldn’t hold up.” 
Jeff Mitchell, then 14, was shot and killed 
during a robbery attempt outside Terry 
Parker High. 
Omar Shareef Jones, now 41, was convicted 
of first-degree murder and originally 
sentenced to death for shooting Mitchell as he 
waited outside school for a ride home. Also 
sentenced for first-degree murder was 
Edward Jerome Goodman, 41, who received 
life in prison. Two others involved in the 
shooting were convicted of second-degree 
murder. 
When the Florida Supreme Court overturned 
Jones’ death penalty in 1998 and ordered him 
resentenced to life, Mitchell experienced an 
emotion that he’d never expected to have. 
“It seemed like Jeff’s life had just been 
cheapened,” Mitchell said. “It wasn’t the 
case, but even though I knew this was likely 
to happen, that’s what it felt like.” 
The feeling went away at the end of the day, 
but it’s something Mitchell said he always 
remembered because it was so unexpected. 
While Mitchell will never experience that 
feeling again, many other people may soon 
deal with similar emotions. 
Cecil King was convicted of beating 82-year-
old Renie Telzer-Bain to death with a 
hammer. The jury recommended death on an 
8-4 vote. 
Telzer-Bain’s daughter-in-law, Lysa Telzer, 
said it was “unnerving” to think King may get 
his death sentence thrown out. 
“The law was followed in putting him on 
Death Row,” she said. “There was never any 
doubt that he was guilty.” 
To put her family and other families who lost 
someone to violent crime through this isn’t 
fair, and it isn’t justice, Telzer said. 
If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Hurst, 
it shouldn’t be retroactive, she said. Everyone 
now on Death Row should remain and new 
rules requiring a unanimous jury verdict of 
death should only factor into future cases. 
RETROACTIVE 
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If the U.S. Supreme Court rules for Hurst, the 
62 First Coast Death Row inmates who had 
at least one juror recommend life will likely 
all claim they should have their death-penalty 
sentences thrown out. But Stephen Harper, a 
Florida International University law 
professor who previously worked as an 
assistant public defender in Miami, believes 
that most of them won’t be happy with what 
happens next. 
After Ring vs. Arizona was decided in 2002 
the U.S. Supreme Court issued a follow-up 
ruling in 2004 that said the Ring decision 
couldn’t be applied retroactively. That means 
anyone sentenced to death before 2002, such 
as Clark, is probably out of luck. 
But since 2002 every lawyer of someone 
facing a potential Death Row sentence 
always makes a motion to declare Florida’s 
death-penalty rules unconstitutional, citing 
the Ring case. The motion is always denied 
by the trial judge, but on making that motion 
the issue is preserved for an appeal. 
 
Which, in layman’s terms, means that 
everyone sentenced to death after 2002 has a 
chance of getting off Death Row. 
The Florida Department of Corrections lists 
about 30 First Coast Death Row inmates who 
have arrived on Death Row since 2002, 
although a few of them were originally 
sentenced before 2002 but had to be retried or 
resentenced after that date. 
Shirk said he hopes that if the Supreme Court 
rules in favor of Hurst, the justices will 
explain in detail what it means for other 
people on Death Row in Florida. He said he 
thinks prosecutors will be more reluctant to 
seek the death penalty if a unanimous jury 
recommendation of death is required. 
“But I can’t say that will apply to our own 
prosecutor,” Shirk said, referring to State 
Attorney Angela Corey, who has put more 
people on Death Row than any other 
prosecutor in Florida since she took office in 
2009. 
THE EFFECT 
State Attorney Senior Managing Director 
Bernie de la Rionda, who has put more 
people on Death Row than just about any 
other prosecutor in Florida and spoke on 
behalf of Corey to the Times-Union, said the 
office would not change how the death 
penalty is sought if the ruling goes through. 
But de la Rionda expressed hope that justices 
would recognize that the current system is 
fair. 
A jury has already made a unanimous finding 
that a person is guilty of first-degree murder 
before they decide whether someone 
deserves death, and that’s the most important 
finding a jury makes, he said. 
“We believe the system as it is now works 
and is accurate and fair,” he said. 
De la Rionda also cited Ted Bundy, one of 
the most notorious serial killers in Florida 
history, as an example of why the death 
penalty is fair even without a unanimous jury 
verdict of death. 
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Bundy was executed for the murder of 12-
year-old Kimberly Leach of Lake City, but he 
might have killed up to 30 women. The 
Orlando jury who convicted Bundy 
recommended death on a 10-2 vote. 
“I think the most anti-death penalty person 
would struggle with keeping him alive,” de la 
Rionda said. 
But former Jacksonville State Attorney Harry 
Shorstein said the Bundy argument has been 
used for years, and it’s not really valid. 
“If that jury had to be unanimous, I think it 
would have been,” he said. “Those 10 jurors 
would have gotten the other two to change 
their votes.” 
If that hadn’t happened, Bundy would have 
ended up being executed for another murder, 
Shorstein said. 
While prosecutors argue that many majority 
verdicts recommending death would become 
unanimous verdicts if that was the 
requirement, Chipperfield isn’t so sure. 
When picking juries, defense lawyers always 
seek assurances from potential jurors that 
they will stick to what they believe even if 
other jurors disagree with them, and most 
jurors say they will do that. 
“I know prosecutors say the other jurors 
would wear the holdouts down,” 
Chipperfield said. “But in other states, all you 
need is one juror opposed to death and you’ve 
got a life sentence.” 
De la Rionda said a lot of the 9-3 or 10-2 
recommendations of death should be taken 
with a grain of salt because some people vote 
no because they know they’re outvoted and 
don’t want a death sentence on their 
conscience. 
He remembers one death-penalty vote in a 
case he tried that was either 10-2 or 11-1, and 
afterward a juror came up to him and 
apologized that it wasn’t unanimous. 
“That juror said everyone wanted death, a 
couple of them just didn’t want to vote for it,” 
de la Rionda said. “I am convinced some 
people vote for life even though they really 
think a defendant deserves death.” 
De la Rionda said it would be more difficult 
if the Supreme Court requires a unanimous 
jury to call for death. But he doesn’t think it 
will reduce the number of people his office 
puts on Death Row. 
Juror selection will take more time and trials 
might also take longer, but the results will 
likely remain the same, he said. 
De la Rionda also said if the Supreme Court 
throws out the death-penalty convictions of 
people in Jacksonville based on a jury not 
being unanimous, his office has the option of 
seeking another penalty phase with a new 
jury that puts those people back on Death 
Row. 
“I think  Ms. Corey would seek to put all of 
them back on Death Row,” de la Rionda said. 
His office hasn’t spoken to victims’ families 
yet in detail about this, although de la Rionda 
said a few have contacted them. 
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“It’s too early to talk about this,” de la Rionda 
said. “We don’t want to add to their stress.” 
But the Hurst case already is making an 
impact. Attorneys for Lance Eugene 
Kirkpatrick, convicted this month for killing 
38-year-old Kim Dorsey, asked Circuit Judge 
Mark Hulsey to delay his death-penalty phase 
until after the court rules on Hurst’s case. 
“This court should strike the death notice and 
move to protect Mr. Kirkpatrick from a trial 
under a scheme which, as shown below, the 
Supreme Court is virtually certain to find 
unconstitutional,” said attorney Julie Schlax 
in her motion. “To allow a death sentence in 
these circumstances would waste scarce 
judicial resources and, more important, 
subject the defendant to constitutionally 
infirm capital proceedings.” 
Hulsey refused to delay the sentencing phase, 
and the jury rejected prosecutors’ calls to 
execute him and recommended life without 
parole. 
De la Rionda said at least one other death-
penalty case is getting the same motion, but 
it’s not realistic to wait for the Supreme Court 
to rule. 
“We have to try these cases,” he said. “It gets 
more difficult to prove your case the longer 
you wait. 
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“Talking About the Death Penalty, Court to Court” 
The New York Times 
Linda Greenhouse 
August 20, 2015 
The Connecticut Supreme Court could have 
taken an easy route to finding the state’s 
death penalty unconstitutional in 
the decision it issued last week. The State 
Legislature repealed the death penalty in 
2012, but it made the repeal prospective, 
leaving 11 men on death row. The reason for 
the prospective-only repeal was obvious to 
all: Two of the death-row inmates, Joshua 
Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes, had 
committed a horrific home-invasion triple 
murder that shocked the state in 2007, and the 
prospect of barring their execution was 
unpalatable to Connecticut politicians and 
many members of the public. 
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the 
State Supreme Court might simply have 
found the distinction between those who 
committed murder before and after the repeal 
date of April 25, 2012, to be arbitrary — a 
violation of due process, equal protection or 
both. Taking the repeal law, signed by Gov. 
Dannel P. Malloy, to embody the collective 
judgment of the people’s elected 
representatives that capital punishment is no 
longer an appropriate tool of criminal justice 
in Connecticut, on what basis could the state 
apply the death penalty to one class of 
murderers and spare another, with the two 
groups separated only by the date of offense? 
The 92-page majority opinion in Connecticut 
v. Santiago, written by Justice Richard N. 
Palmer for four of the court’s seven justices, 
was much more ambitious than that, 
however, and in its ambition lies its 
significance. 
On hearing that the Connecticut Supreme 
Court had invalidated the state’s death 
penalty, many people probably shrugged and 
thought, “O.K., that’s one little blue state that 
hardly ever executed anyone (a single 
execution in the past 55 years, if you’re 
counting) and that was already never going to 
add anyone new to death row. How important 
can this decision be?” 
That was, frankly, my thought as well, and I 
picked up the decision — more than 200 
pages, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions — with some reluctance and a sense 
of obligation. (My apartment building is 
across the street from the New Haven 
courthouse where crowds, gathered for the 
consecutive trials in the home-invasion 
murders, blocked the sidewalks for weeks in 
2010 and 2011.) But I turned the pages with 
mounting excitement. In the breadth of its 
perspective on the history and current 
problematic state of the death penalty, in its 
cleareyed dissection of the irreconcilable 
conflict at the heart of modern death-penalty 
jurisprudence, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court not only produced an important 
decision for its own jurisdiction; but it 
addressed the United States Supreme Court 
frankly and directly. The decision engages 
the Supreme Court at a crucial moment of 
mounting unease, within the court and 
outside it, with the death penalty’s trajectory 
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over the nearly four decades since the court 
permitted states to resume executions. 
Next year marks the 40th anniversary 
of Gregg v. Georgia and the four other 
Supreme Court decisions that reviewed the 
new generation of laws the states enacted in 
an effort to comply with the 1972 decision 
that had invalidated all existing death-penalty 
laws. “These death sentences are cruel and 
unusual in the same way that being struck by 
lightning is cruel and unusual,” Justice Potter 
Stewart famously wrote in a concurring 
opinion in the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia. 
The new laws that the Supreme Court upheld 
were supposed to avoid just such 
arbitrariness by limiting those defendants 
deemed eligible for the death penalty and by 
channeling juries’ discretion over when to 
impose it. 
The problem, as the Connecticut Supreme 
Court demonstrates, is that it hasn’t worked. 
Of some 200 cases in the state that might 
have been charged as capital murder between 
1973 and 2007, prosecutors sought the death 
penalty in some 130 and obtained death 
sentences in 12. “The selection of which 
offenders live and which offenders die 
appears to be inescapably tainted by caprice 
and bias,” the court said, pointing to “an 
inherent conflict in the requirements that the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment, as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court, imposes on 
any capital sentencing scheme.” 
On the one hand, the death penalty can’t be 
automatic, but has to result from specific 
findings about the crime and the defendant 
through a process that relies on specifically 
identified “aggravating factors.” That’s the 
effort to channel discretion and treat like 
cases alike. On the other hand, the jury must 
have absolute discretion to consider any 
“mitigating factors” that it deems relevant. 
That’s the effort to treat each defendant as an 
individual. The United States Supreme Court 
deems both efforts as constitutionally 
essential. But to quote from the Connecticut 
opinion: 
“The question is whether this individualized 
sentencing requirement inevitably allows in 
through the back door the same sorts of 
caprice and freakishness that the court sought 
to exclude in Furman, or, worse, whether 
individualized sentencing necessarily opens 
the door to racial and ethnic discrimination in 
capital sentencing. In other words, is it ever 
possible to eliminate arbitrary and 
discriminatory application of capital 
punishment through a more precise and 
restrictive definition of capital crimes if 
prosecutors always remain free not to seek 
the death penalty for a particular defendant, 
and juries not to impose it, for any reason 
whatsoever? We do not believe that it is.” 
Six weeks earlier, Justices Stephen G. Breyer 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from 
the decision that rejected a challenge to 
Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol, 
identified another inherent contradiction. 
Deploring lengthy delays that “both 
aggravate the cruelty of the death penalty and 
undermine its jurisprudential rationale” (the 
average delay between sentencing and 
execution is now more than 17 years, they 
noted), the justices said that the “special need 
for reliability and fairness in capital cases” 
means that substantial delay is inevitable. 
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Justice Breyer, who wrote the 42-page 
dissenting opinion that Justice Ginsburg 
joined, said this: “In this world, or at least in 
this nation, we can have a death penalty that 
at least arguably serves legitimate 
penological purposes or we can have a 
procedural system that at least arguably seeks 
reliability and fairness in the death penalty’s 
application. We cannot have both.” 
The two justices didn’t flatly declare a belief 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional, 
saying rather that it was “highly likely” to 
violate the Eighth Amendment; the court, 
they said, should invite full briefing on that 
question “rather than try to patch up the death 
penalty’s legal wounds one at a time.” 
Like the Connecticut justices, these two 
justices went beyond the confines of the case 
before them to confront the deeper questions. 
(Along with Justice Elena Kagan, Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg also signed Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion, which 
more conventionally addressed the 
majority’s holding on lethal injection.) The 
Connecticut decision and the Breyer-
Ginsburg dissent were meant for wider 
audiences, and to a notable degree, each 
found an audience in the other. The 
Connecticut justices cited Justice Breyer’s 
dissent. I have no idea whether Justice Breyer 
knew about the Connecticut case, which had 
been pending for more than two years by the 
time the United States Supreme Court issued 
its lethal injection decision, Glossip v. Gross, 
on June 29. (I found no mention of the 
Connecticut case in the briefs the court 
received.) But Justice Breyer did cite the 
same statistical evidence in the same study of 
the Connecticut death penalty that the 
Connecticut justices used, concluding that 
“such studies indicate that the factors that 
most clearly ought to affect application of the 
death penalty — namely, comparative 
egregiousness of the crime — often do not.” 
Were the Connecticut justices emboldened 
by Justice Breyer’s invitation to grapple with 
the death penalty itself? Maybe they were; 
coming late in what by all signs was a 
brutally contentious process within the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, the Breyer 
dissent must have appeared to the majority 
justices as a gift from on high, an open door. 
And clearly Justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
mean to spur hard thinking about the death 
penalty by every judge in the country. 
And what about the Supreme Court itself? 
The last member of the court to renounce the 
death penalty was Justice John Paul Stevens, 
who retired in 2010. In the ensuing five years 
of silence, executions plummeted to a 20-
year low (35 last year, compared with a high 
of 98 in 1999) and public approval of the 
death penalty, at 56 percent earlier this year, 
was the lowest in 40 years. Seven states 
carried out executions last year, compared 
with 20 in 1999. It’s no exaggeration to say 
that there is a widespread de facto 
moratorium in place, even in most of the 
31 states that still have the death penalty on 
their books. (In four of those states — 
Washington, Oregon, Colorado and 
Pennsylvania — governors have imposed an 
actual moratorium.) 
Although a Supreme Court decision 
abolishing the death penalty wouldn’t shock 
much of the country, it’s not easy to imagine 
the John G. Roberts Jr. court taking that step. 
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If the question, as it is so often, is “what 
would Justice Kennedy do?” it’s worth 
noting that he signed neither of the dissenting 
opinions in the lethal injection case. He 
silently joined the majority opinion of Justice 
Samuel A. Alito Jr. — the justice who during 
the oral argument, in one of the uglier 
performances that I can recall on the Supreme 
Court bench, asked the lawyer for the 
Oklahoma death-row inmates whether it was 
“appropriate for the judiciary to countenance 
what amounts to a guerrilla war against the 
death penalty.” On the other hand, Justice 
Kennedy has become an outspoken advocate 
for reform of the criminal justice system, 
with a recent focus on solitary confinement. 
I’m not counting the days, or the Supreme 
Court terms, until the court declares the death 
penalty unconstitutional. But from two 
courts, the highest in the land and the highest 
court of one of the smallest states, a fruitful 
conversation emerged this summer that will 
inevitably spread, gain momentum and, in the 
foreseeable if not immediate future, lead the 
Supreme Court to take the step that I think a 
majority of today’s justices know is the right 
one. 
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“Death Penalty in Fast-Food Slaying” 
Pensacola News Journal 
August 16, 2012 
A judge this morning sentenced a Pensacola 
man who brutally murdered his boss at a 
restaurant during a robbery in 1998 to death. 
 
Timothy Hurst, 32, was convicted in April 
2000 of first-degree murder in the killing of 
28-year-old Cynthia Harrison. Harrison was 
Hurst's manager when he worked at the 
Popeye's on Nine Mile Road. Her body was 
found in the restaurant's freezer. 
 
Her hands and mouth were wrapped with 
electrical tape, authorities said at the time, 
and her body had been slashed more than 60 
times with a box cutter. 
 
Circuit Judge Linda Nobles read the order 
sentencing Hurst during a hearing that lasted 
about 30 minutes at the M.C. Blanchard 
Judicial Building in Pensacola. 
 
Hurst, who was in the courtroom dressed in a 
green and white jumpsuit, did not react after 
she read her decision. 
 
This is the second time Hurst has been 
sentenced to death. 
 
In 2000, a jury decided 11-1 that he deserved 
the death penalty. 
 
Former Circuit Judge Joseph Tarbuck 
initially sentenced him to death for what he 
called an "especially heinous, atrocious and 
cruel" crime, explaining that Hurst murdered 
Harrison in an attempt to cover his tracks for 
robbing the restaurant. 
 
However, that sentence was overturned by 
the Florida Supreme Court in 2009 because 
certain pieces of evidence, including those 
that established Hurst's mental capacity, were 
not shown to the jury during the penalty 
phase, said Assistant State Attorney John 
Molchan. 
 
A new penalty phase was held over several 
days last year, and the jury decided 7-5 to 
recommend the death penalty. While the 
jury's recommendation is given consideration 
for Hurst's sentence, his fate ultimately lies in 
Nobles' hands. 
 
Molchan said the defendant's attorney 
presented evidence showing that Hurst had a 
lower mental capacity during last year's 
penalty phase. 
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Kansas v. Carr 
14-449 (consolidated with Kansas v. Carr, 14-450) 
Ruling Below: State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 340 (Kan. 2014) 
Defendant Jonathan D. Carr, and his brother, Reginald Dexter Carr, Jr., were jointly charged, 
tried, convicted, and sentenced for crimes committed in a series of incidents in December 2000 
in Wichita.  
The Kansas Supreme Court determined that (a) the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant 
of felony murder because his possession of the murder weapon was clear in that he had it in his 
possession minutes after the shooting, and he thoroughly cleaned both the gun and the bullets it 
held; defendant's conviction did not require inference to be stacked upon inference; (b) The trial 
court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial based on comments made by the codefendant's 
counsel during opening statements; at the time counsel wrapped up his opening statement, the 
jury was immediately told that his remarks were "improper;" and (c) The trial judge's failure to 
sever the penalty phase of defendant and the codefendant's trial violated defendant's U.S. Const. 
amend. VIII right to an individualized sentencing determination and could not be deemed 
harmless error. (Credit Lexis Nexis) 
Question Presented: Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be 
affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances “need not be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is 
satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and 
weigh any mitigating circumstances; and whether the trial court's decision not to sever the 
sentencing phase of the co-defendant brothers’ trial here – a decision that comports with the 
traditional approach preferring joinder in circumstances like this – violated an Eighth 
Amendment right to an “individualized sentencing” determination and was not harmless in any 
event. 
 
 
State of KANSAS 
Appellee 
v. 
Jonathan D. CARR 
Appellant 
 
Supreme Court of Kansas 
 
July 25, 2014, Opinion Filed 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
 
PER CURIUM: 
 
This is J. Carr's direct appeal from his 43 
convictions and four death sentences. 
 
Our opinion in codefendant R. Carr's direct 
appeal also is filed today. With the exception 
of the brief introduction to follow, this 
opinion will refer to the opinion in R. Carr's 
appeal as much as possible, rather than repeat 
facts, procedural history, or legal discussions 
and resolutions. 
 
The first incident giving rise to the charges in 
this case occurred on December 7 and 8. 
Andrew Schreiber was the victim. The State 
charged J. Carr and R. Carr with one count of 
kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, 
one count of aggravated battery, and one 
count of criminal damage to property. The 
jury acquitted J. Carr on all counts and 
convicted R. Carr on all counts. 
 
In the second incident on December 11, 
Linda Ann Walenta was the victim. The State 
charged J. Carr and R. Carr with one count of 
first-degree felony murder. The jury 
convicted both men. 
 
In the third incident on December 14 and 15, 
Heather M., Aaron S., Brad H., Jason B., and 
Holly G. were the victims of an invasion at 
the men's Birchwood Drive home that led to 
sex crimes, kidnappings, robberies, and, 
eventually, murder and attempted murder. 
The State charged J. Carr and R. Carr with 
eight alternative counts of capital murder, 
four based on a related sex crime under 
K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4) and four based on 
multiple first-degree premeditated murders 
under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6); one count of 
attempted first-degree murder; five counts of 
aggravated kidnapping; nine counts of 
aggravated robbery, eight of which were 
alternatives, four based on use of a dangerous 
weapon and four based on infliction of bodily 
harm; one count of aggravated burglary; 13 
counts of rape, eight of which were based on 
coerced victim-on-victim sexual intercourse 
and one of which was based on a victim's 
coerced self-penetration; three counts of 
aggravated criminal sodomy, two of which 
were based on coerced victim-on-victim oral 
sex; seven counts of attempted rape, six of 
which were based on coerced victim-on-
victim overt acts toward the perpetration of 
rape; one count of burglary; and one count of 
theft. The State also charged J. Carr and R. 
Carr with one count of cruelty to animals 
because of the killing of Holly G.'s dog. The 
jury convicted J. Carr and R. Carr on all of 
the charges arising out of the Birchwood 
incident. 
 
In connection with the three incidents, the 
State also charged R. Carr alone with three 
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. 
The jury convicted him on these three counts 
as well. 
 
After J. Carr's acquittal on the Schreiber 
incident and the defendants' convictions on 
all other charges, in a separate capital penalty 
proceeding, J. Carr and R. Carr were 
sentenced to death for each of the four capital 
murders committed on December 15. They 
each received a hard 20 life sentence for the 
Walenta felony murder. J. Carr received a 
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controlling total of 492 months' 
imprisonment consecutive to the hard 20 life 
sentence, and R. Carr received a controlling 
total of 570 months' imprisonment 
consecutive to the hard 20 life sentence for 
the remaining non-death-eligible 
convictions. 
 
In his briefs, J. Carr raises 21 issues tied to 
the guilt phase of his prosecution and 16 
issues tied to the death penalty phase of his 
prosecution. In addition, because this is a 
death penalty case, this court is empowered 
to notice and discuss unassigned potential 
errors under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6619(b), 
which we do. J. Carr does not challenge the 
sentences he received for the Walenta felony 
murder; for the crimes in which Heather M., 
Aaron S., Brad H., Jason B., and Holly G. 
were the victims that were not eligible for the 
death penalty; or for the cruelty to animals 
conviction. 
 
Both sides sought many extensions of time to 
file briefs in this appeal and in R. Carr's 
separate appeal. In J. Carr's case, all of these 
extension requests were unopposed by the 
other side of the case. After completion of 
briefing, this court heard oral argument on 
December 17, 2013. 
 
After searching review of the record, careful 
examination of the parties' arguments, 
extensive independent legal research, and 
lengthy deliberations, we affirm 25 of J. 
Carr's 43 convictions, including those for one 
count of capital murder of Heather M., 
Aaron S., Brad H., and Jason B. under K.S.A. 
21-3439(a)(6) and for the felony murder of 
Walenta. We reverse the three remaining 
convictions for capital murder because of 
charging and multiplicity errors. We also 
reverse his convictions on Counts 25, 26, 29 
through 40, and 42 for coerced sex acts for 
similar reasons. We affirm the convictions 
based on Counts 2, 9 through 24, 27, 28, 41, 
and 43 through 55. 
 
We vacate J. Carr's death sentence for the 
remaining capital murder conviction, because 
the district judge refused to sever the 
defendants' penalty phase trials. We remand 
to the district court for further proceedings. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND FOR GUILT PHASE 
ISSUES 
 
The general factual and procedural 
background for the guilt phase issues in this 
case is set out in full in the R. Carr opinion. 
We need not repeat it or supplement it here. 
To the extent additional, issue-specific 
factual or procedural background is 
necessary to resolve any legal issue unique to 
J. Carr, it will be included in the discussion 
sections below. 
 
GUILT PHASE ISSUES AND SHORT 
ANSWERS 
 
We begin our discussion by setting out the 
questions we answer today on the guilt phase 
of J. Carr's trial. We have taken the liberty of 
reformulating certain questions to focus on 
their legally significant aspects or effects. We 
also have reordered questions raised by the 
defense and have inserted among them 
unassigned potential errors noted by us, 
because we believe this organization 
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enhances clarity. We number the questions 
disposed of by our opinion in R. Carr's appeal 
1 through 21, despite occasional intervening 
subheadings. We do not repeat our full 
discussion of these questions in this opinion; 
rather, we include only their short answers 
and references to the appropriate sections of 
the R. Carr opinion that control the resolution 
of the similar issues raised or noticed in this 
appeal. We number the four additional 
questions not disposed of by our opinion in 
R. Carr's appeal J1 through J4. Our short 
answer to each question follows the question. 
We then discuss these four questions fully in 
individual sections of this opinion. 
 
Issues Disposed of by Opinion in R. Carr 
Appeal 
 
Issues Affecting All Incidents 
 
1. Did the district judge err in refusing to 
grant defense motions for change of venue? 
A majority of six of the court's members 
answers this question no for reasons 
explained in Section 1 of the R. Carr opinion, 
while one member of the court dissents and 
writes separately on this issue and its 
reversibility, standing alone. 
 
2. Did the district judge err in refusing to 
sever the guilt phase of defendants' trial? A 
majority of six members of the court answers 
this question yes for reasons explained in 
Section 2 of the R. Carr opinion, while one 
member of the court dissents and writes 
separately on this issue. A majority of four 
members of the court agrees that any error on 
this issue was not reversible standing alone 
for reasons explained in the R. Carr appeal, 
while three members of the court dissent, and 
one of them writes separately for the three on 
the reversibility question. 
 
3. Was it error for the State to pursue 
conviction of J. Carr for all counts arising out 
of the three December 2000 incidents in one 
prosecution? The court unanimously answers 
this question no for reasons explained in 
Section 3 of the R. Carr opinion. 
4. Did the district judge err (a) by excusing 
prospective juror M.W., who opposed the 
death penalty, for cause, (b) by failing to 
excuse allegedly mitigation-impaired jury 
panel members W.B., D.R., D.Ge., and H.Gu. 
for cause, or (c) by excusing prospective 
jurors K.J., M.G., H.D., C.R., D.H., and 
M.B., who expressed moral or religious 
reservations about the death penalty, for 
cause? The court unanimously agrees there 
was no error on any of these bases for reasons 
explained in Section 4 of the R. Carr opinion. 
 
5. Did the district judge err by rejecting a 
defense challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 
to the State's peremptory strike of juror and 
eventual foreperson W.B.? The court 
unanimously answers this question yes for 
reasons explained in Section 5 of the R. Carr 
opinion. A majority of four members of the 
court agrees that any error on this issue was 
not reversible standing alone for reasons 
explained in Section 5 of the R. Carr opinion, 
while three members of the court dissent, and 
one of them writes separately for the three on 
the reversibility question. 
 
Issue Specific to Walenta Incident 
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6. Was the district judge's admission of 
statements by Walenta through law 
enforcement error under the Sixth 
Amendment and Crawford v. Washington? 
The court unanimously answers this question 
yes for reasons explained in Section 6 of the 
R. Carr opinion, but the court also 
unanimously agrees that this error was not 
reversible standing alone. 
Issues Specific to Quadruple Homicide and 
Other Birchwood Crimes 
 
7. Did faulty jury instructions on all four 
K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4) sex-crime-based 
capital murders and a multiplicity problem on 
three of four K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) multiple-
death capital murders combine to require 
reversal of three of J. Carr's death-eligible 
convictions? The court unanimously answers 
this question yes for reasons explained in 
Section 9 of the R. Carr opinion. 
 
8. Was a special unanimity instruction 
required for Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7 because of 
multiple sex crimes underlying each count? 
The court declines to reach the merits of this 
issue for reasons explained in Section 10 of 
the R. Carr opinion. 
 
9. Must sex crime convictions underlying 
capital murder Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7 be 
reversed because they were lesser included 
offenses of capital murder under K.S.A. 21-
3439 (a)(4)? The court declines to reach the 
merits of this issue for reasons explained in 
Section 11 of the R. Carr opinion. 
 
10. Was the State's evidence of aggravated 
burglary sufficient? The court unanimously 
answers this question yes for reasons 
explained in Section 12 of the R. Carr 
opinion. 
 
11. Did the State fail to correctly charge and 
the district judge fail to correctly instruct on 
coerced victim-on-victim rape and attempted 
rape, as those crimes are defined by Kansas 
statutes, rendering J. Carr's convictions on 
those offenses void for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction? The court unanimously answers 
this question yes for reasons explained in 
Section 13 of the R. Carr opinion. 
 
12. Was the State's evidence of J. Carr's guilt 
as a principal on Count 41 for Holly G.'s 
digital self-penetration sufficient? A majority 
of four of the court's members answers this 
question yes for reasons explained in Section 
14 of the R. Carr opinion, while three 
members of the court dissent, and one of 
them writes separately for the two of them on 
this issue and its reversibility. 
 
13. Were Count 41 and Count 42 
multiplicitous? The court unanimously 
answers this question yes and reverses J. 
Carr's conviction as a principal on Count 42 
for reasons explained in Section 15 of the R. 
Carr opinion. 
 
14. Was evidence of results from 
mitochondrial DNA testing of hairs found at 
the Birchwood home erroneously admitted? 
The court unanimously answers this question 
no for reasons explained in Section 19 of the 
R. Carr opinion. 
 
15. Did the district judge err by failing to 
instruct on felony murder as a lesser included 
crime of capital murder? The court 
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unanimously answers this question no for 
reasons explained in Section 21 of the R. Carr 
opinion. 
 
Other Evidentiary Issues 
16. Did the district judge err by automatically 
excluding eyewitness identification expert 
testimony proffered by the defense? The 
court unanimously answers this question yes 
for reasons explained in Section 22 of the R. 
Carr opinion, but the court also unanimously 
agrees that any error on this issue was not 
reversible standing alone. 
 
17. Did the district judge err by permitting a 
jury view of locations referenced in evidence, 
in violation of the defendants' right to be 
present, right to assistance of counsel, and 
right to a public trial? The court unanimously 
answers this question no for reasons 
explained in Section 23 of the R. Carr 
opinion. 
 
Other Instructional Issues 
 
18. Did the district judge err by failing to 
include language in the instruction on 
reliability of eyewitness identifications to 
ensure that jurors considered possible 
infirmities in cross-racial identifications? 
The court unanimously answers this question 
no for reasons explained in Section 24 of the 
R. Carr opinion. 
 
19. Was the instruction on aiding and 
abetting erroneous because (a) it permitted 
jurors to convict the defendants as aiders and 
abettors for reasonably foreseeable crimes of 
the other, regardless of whether the State 
proved the aider and abettor's premeditation, 
(b) it failed to communicate that the 
defendant aider and abettor had to possess the 
premeditated intent to kill in order to be 
convicted of capital murder, or (c) it omitted 
language from K.S.A. 21-3205(2)? The court 
unanimously answers the first question yes 
for reasons explained in Section 25 of the R. 
Carr opinion. The court unanimously 
answers the second question no for reasons 
explained in Section 25 of the R. Carr 
opinion. The court unanimously answers the 
third question no for reasons explained in 
Section 25 of the R. Carr opinion. The court 
unanimously agrees that the error on the first 
question was not reversible standing alone 
for reasons explained in Section 25 of the R. 
Carr opinion. 
 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
20. Did one of the prosecutors commit 
reversible misconduct by telling jurors to 
place themselves in the position of the 
victims? The court unanimously answers this 
question no for reasons explained in Section 
26 of the R. Carr opinion. 
 
Cumulative Error 
 
21. Did cumulative error deny J. Carr a fair 
trial on his guilt? A majority of four of the 
court's members answers this question no for 
reasons explained in Section 27 of the R. Carr 
opinion, while three members of the court 
dissent, and one of them writes separately for 
them on this issue. 
 
Issues Not Disposed of by Opinion in R. 
Carr Appeal 
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J1. Did the district judge err by refusing to 
grant a mistrial when the opening statement 
by R. Carr's counsel implicated J. Carr and 
another unknown man as the perpetrators of 
the Birchwood crimes? A majority of four of 
the court's members answers this question no. 
Three members of the court would hold this 
to be error and include it among those 
considered under the cumulative error 
doctrine. 
 
J2. Did admission of Walenta's statements 
violate J. Carr's confrontation rights under 
Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights? The court declines to reach the merits 
of the Section 10 argument. 
 
J3. Did J. Carr's conviction on the Walenta 
felony murder depend upon impermissible 
inference stacking, meaning the State's 
evidence was insufficient? A majority of six 
members of the court answers this question 
no. One member of the court dissents and 
writes separately on this issue and its 
reversibility, standing alone. 
 
J4. Was the State's evidence of J. Carr's guilt 
as an aider and abettor of R. Carr's rape and 
aggravated criminal sodomy of Holly G. 
sufficient? The court unanimously answers 
this question yes. 
 
J1. REFUSAL TO GRANT MISTRIAL 
AFTER OPENING STATEMENTS 
 
This court rules today in the R. Carr appeal 
that District Judge Paul Clark erred by 
refusing to sever the defendants' guilt phase 
trials but that the error does not require 
reversal standing alone. These holdings apply 
equally to this appeal on behalf of J. Carr. 
 
J. Carr has argued additional reasons peculiar 
to him why severance was required—that a 
joint trial limited his ability to introduce 
certain hearsay testimony through Tronda 
Adams, that it allowed R. Carr to act as a 
second prosecutor by introducing testimony 
from Stephanie Donley and a statement from 
Holly G. that were inculpatory of J. Carr, and 
that it permitted the jury to observe and be 
prejudiced by R. Carr's improper courtroom 
behavior. But these reasons, if meritorious, 
would only add weight to our holding that the 
failure to sever was error. They would not 
persuade us that reversal of all of J. Carr's 
convictions is required as a result of that 
error. 
 
We mention the severance issue in this 
context because it is distinct from but related 
to the unique challenge J. Carr makes on this 
appeal to Judge Clark's refusal to grant him a 
mistrial after opening statements. 
 
R. Carr's counsel told the jury during opening 
statement that his client merely stored 
property stolen from the Birchwood victims 
for J. Carr and another unknown, uncharged 
third man, suggesting that J. Carr and the 
third man were responsible for all of the 
charged Birchwood crimes. These remarks 
prompted an objection from counsel for J. 
Carr on the grounds that they were 
argumentative and unsupported by the 
evidence. Judge Clark overruled the 
objection. 
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This ruling by Judge Clark was correct. 
Counsel for R. Carr began his explanation of 
what happened on the night of December 14 
and 15, 2000, with the phrase "the evidence 
will show." That phrase signals the purpose 
of opening statement; it provides an 
opportunity for counsel to outline a version 
of events that he or she expects the evidence 
to prove to the jury. In addition, the objection 
by J. Carr's counsel that the opening 
statement was unsupported by evidence was 
virtually impossible to sustain at that stage of 
the case, when all evidence was yet to be 
admitted. 
 
R. Carr's counsel continued to discuss the 
involvement of J. Carr and the third unknown 
man in the Birchwood crimes, finally 
observing that "the Birchwood address is 
replete with Jonathan Carr's DNA . . . . 
Ultimately, the DNA evidence will show that 
Jonathan Carr, not Reginald Carr, Jonathan 
Carr committed most, if not all of the crimes 
which are alleged in the complaint and that 
he did it with a third black male who still 
walks the streets of Wichita." 
 
At this point the State objected, and Judge 
Clark sustained the objection, saying, "It's an 
improper comment." 
 
During that day's lunch break, outside the 
presence of the jury, the State argued that the 
opening statement by counsel for R. Carr had 
violated rulings on motions in limine and that 
he should be sanctioned for misconduct. The 
prosecutor also asked the judge to instruct the 
jury to disregard the statement. J. Carr moved 
for a mistrial. The grounds his counsel 
advanced in support of the motion, although 
abbreviated, were exactly the same as those 
advanced in support of J. Carr's multiple 
motions for severance: The defenses of J. 
Carr and R. Carr were mutually and 
irreconcilably antagonistic. 
 
When examining an appellate claim arising 
out of denial of a mistrial, we review the 
district judge's decision for an abuse of 
discretion. We first ask whether the district 
judge abused his or her discretion when 
deciding whether there was a fundamental 
failure in the proceedings. If so, we then 
examine whether the district judge abused his 
or her discretion when deciding whether the 
problematic conduct resulted in prejudice 
that could not be cured or mitigated through 
jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an 
injustice.  
 
Having already held that defense motions for 
severance of the guilt phase should have been 
granted, we also hold that Judge Clark abused 
his discretion by failing to recognize a 
fundamental failure in the proceedings when 
R. Carr's counsel made his remarks during 
opening statement. Those remarks made the 
irreconcilable antagonism of the 
codefendants' cases inescapably clear. 
However, also in line with the majority view 
on severance, we further hold that there was 
no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a 
mistrial to cure that failure. 
 
At the time R. Carr's counsel wrapped up his 
opening statement, the jury was immediately 
told that his remarks were "improper." No 
evidence to support the third-party theory of 
the case was ever introduced. And, 
ultimately, the jury received the usual 
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instruction that statements of counsel are not 
evidence. Under these circumstances, we do 
not discern enough additional damage to J. 
Carr's case attributable to the opening 
statement by R. Carr's counsel—i.e., any 
damage beyond that J. Carr's case already 
was bound to suffer because of the denial of 
severance—to persuade us that all of his 
convictions must be reversed. 
 
J2. CONFRONTATION RIGHTS 
UNDER SECTION 10 OF KANSAS 
CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
Like R. Carr, J. Carr challenges the 
admission of Walenta's statements under the 
Sixth Amendment and the Confrontation 
Clause. We have fully discussed those 
arguments in Section 6 of the R. Carr opinion 
and need not revisit them here. J. Carr also 
invoked Section 10 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights in support of his 
position on this issue, and it is that invocation 
that prompts us to make a brief response in 
this opinion. 
 
We have not previously differentiated the 
rights of a defendant protected by the Sixth 
Amendment and those protected by Section 
10. And we need not do so here. We leave the 
merits of any argument under Section 10 to 
the next case. 
 
J3. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ON 
WALENTA FELONY MURDER 
 
J. Carr challenges the evidence supporting his 
conviction of Walenta's felony murder as 
insufficient, arguing that impermissible 
inference stacking was required in order for 
the jury to convict. 
 
Additional Factual and Procedural 
Background 
 
Count 51 in the amended complaint charged 
both defendants with first-degree felony 
murder of Walenta while committing or 
attempting to commit the inherently 
dangerous felony of aggravated robbery. 
 
Summarized for ease of reference, the 
evidence showed Walenta was approached 
by a black male shortly after she pulled into 
her driveway about 9:40 p.m. on the evening 
of December 11, 2000. Walenta saw the man 
get out of a light-colored four-door car that 
had followed her and then parked near her 
house. The man indicated in some way that 
he needed assistance, and Walenta rolled 
down her driver's-side window a few inches 
to talk to him. As soon as she did so, the man 
stuck a black handgun into the car, holding it 
palm down and pointing it at her head. When 
she attempted to put her Yukon in reverse to 
get away, the man shot her three times. He 
then ran away and the light-colored car pulled 
away. Walenta said she was not sure whether 
the gunman had been left behind by whoever 
was driving the light-colored car. 
 
Later on the evening of December 11, about 
11:15, J. Carr showed up at Adams' house. 
Adams testified in pertinent part: 
 
"Q. Do you remember what he was 
driving? 
"A. I think he was dropped off that 
night and his brother came back to 
pick him up. 
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"Q. And so you are not sure of the 
vehicle? 
"A. The Camry, it would have been 
the [light-colored four-door] Camry. 
"Q. Okay. So when his brother 
returned, did you see him to the door? 
"A. No, I don't think so. 
"Q. Do you recall whether you saw 
the Camry the early morning hours of 
the 12th? 
"A. No, I don't, no." 
 
Adams also testified that J. Carr had a black 
handgun with him on the same night, which 
he left with her. Late the next day he asked 
her to return the gun to him, scolded her for 
touching it too much, and then proceeded to 
clean it and every bullet in it thoroughly. 
Adams identified the black Lorcin at trial as 
the gun J. Carr had with him on the night of 
December 11, 2000. 
 
A few days later, after J. Carr and R. Carr had 
been arrested in the wake of the Birchwood 
crimes, Walenta picked two pictures out of a 
photo array as representative of the general 
appearance of the man who had shot her. One 
of those pictures was of R. Carr. She also said 
that the eyes of the man in the photo of R. 
Carr represented what she remembered of the 
gunman's eyes. She did not see anyone else at 
the scene of the shooting and was not able to 
pick any photo from an array containing a 
photo of J. Carr. 
 
Ballistics expert testimony established that 
the black handgun used in the shooting of 
Walenta was the same black Lorcin .380 used 
to shoot out Schreiber's tire and to murder the 
four friends from the Birchwood home. 
 
J. Carr was acquitted on the four charges 
arising out of the Schreiber incident and 
convicted on all charges against him arising 
out of the Walenta and Birchwood incidents. 
 
Evidence Sufficiency 
 
Our standard of review on sufficiency claims 
is often stated and familiar: 
 
"When the sufficiency of the 
evidence is challenged in a criminal 
case, the standard of review is 
whether, after review of all the 
evidence, examined in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, the 
appellate court is convinced a rational 
factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. While the State must sustain its 
burden of proof on each element of an 
offense charged, circumstantial 
evidence and the logical inferences 
therefrom are sufficient to support a 
conviction of even the most serious 
crime. If an appellate court holds that 
evidence to support a conviction is 
insufficient as a matter of law, the 
conviction must be reversed; and no 
retrial on the same crime is possible.” 
  
In addition, appellate courts do not reweigh 
evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or 
make witness credibility determinations.  
 
We do not agree with J. Carr that his 
conviction of Walenta's felony murder 
required inference to be stacked upon 
inference. 
 
Walenta saw the gunman emerge from the 
passenger seat of the light-colored car, and 
she saw the car pull away from its parking 
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place immediately after the shooting. A juror 
need only make one inference from these 
facts to arrive at a finding that there was 
another person driving the car that followed 
her. Adams testified that J. Carr was with his 
brother on the night of the crime. Adams' 
testimony on whether she ever saw J. Carr in 
the company of R. Carr on the night of 
December 11 is ambiguous; she may have 
seen them together, but she may not have. 
Regardless, she had many ways of knowing 
they had been together. Her testimony on that 
point was not ambiguous or unclear, and it 
placed J. Carr with R. Carr not long after 
Walenta was shot. This testimony did not 
require the jury to draw an inference at all. 
Adams' testimony on the car J. Carr and R. 
Carr would have been using was equally 
clear. The phrasing of the questions put to her 
gave her every opportunity to say that she 
was unsure; she did not. This testimony, 
again, did not require any inference to be 
stacked on any other inference. Finally, J. 
Carr's possession of the black gun later 
identified as the Walenta murder weapon also 
was clear. He had it in his possession on 
December 11, 90 minutes after Walenta's 
shooting; he gave it to Adams; he took it back 
from her on December 12; he was unhappy 
that she had been handling it, and he cleaned 
it and the bullets it held—remarkably 
thoroughly. These were direct observations 
of Adams. No inference of any kind was 
required. 
 
What was required was the jury's willingness 
to be persuaded of J. Carr's guilt on 
circumstantial evidence. This is expressly 
allowed under Kansas law. Circumstantial 
proof is still proof. It is not equivalent to 
impermissible inference-stacking. It can rise 
to the level of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Particularly when we view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
we conclude the evidence in this case was 
sufficient to convict J. Carr of Walenta's 
murder. This conclusion is reinforced by our 
recent decision in State v. McBroom in which 
we held that evidence of the defendant's 
participation in a string of burglaries with a 
friend could be relied upon by a jury to find 
he also participated in a burglary/homicide 
that was apparently committed by more than 
one person in the same general area and time 
frame. In this case, the evidence against J. 
Carr on the Birchwood incident would 
naturally have reinforced the evidence on the 
Walenta incident. 
 
J4. ACCOMPLICE CULPABILITY FOR 
CODEFENDANT'S SEX CRIMES 
 
J. Carr also challenges his conviction as an 
aider and abettor of R. Carr's rape and 
aggravated criminal sodomy of Holly G. 
We fully discussed the mirror image of this 
challenge in our opinion on the R. Carr 
appeal, in Section 16. There we ruled that R. 
Carr could be found guilty as an aider and 
abettor of J. Carr's sex crimes against Holly 
G. and Heather M., even though R. Carr was 
out of the Birchwood home on a trip with a 
victim to one or more ATMs or in another 
room when the crimes occurred. The all-night 
joint enterprise of the Birchwood intruders 
was plainly and repeatedly demonstrated by 
the State's evidence, particularly Holly G.'s 
lengthy and detailed testimony. Under the 
standard of review recited in the previous 
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section of this opinion, we have no hesitation 
in holding that the evidence J. Carr aided and 
abetted R. Carr's rape and aggravated 
criminal sodomy of Holly G. was sufficient.  
 
CONCLUSION FOR GUILT PHASE 
 
For the reasons set forth above and in the 
opinion filed today in R. Carr's appeal, we 
affirm J. Carr's capital murder conviction 
under Count 2. We reverse his three 
remaining capital murder convictions based 
on the alternative theories under K.S.A. 21-
3439(a)(4) and (a)(6). 
 
We affirm J. Carr's convictions on Counts 9 
through 24. Because four pairs of these 
counts were charged in the alternative, this 
results in affirmance of 12 rather than 16 
convictions. 
 
The convictions based on Counts 25, 26, and 
29 through 40 are void for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. We affirm the 
convictions based on Counts 27 and 28. We 
affirm J. Carr's conviction on Count 41. We 
reverse his conviction on Count 42 because it 
is multiplicitous with Count 41. 
 
We affirm J. Carr's convictions on Counts 43 
through 55. 
 
PENALTY PHASE 
 
The general factual and procedural 
background for the penalty phase issues in 
this case is set out in full in the R. Carr 
opinion. We need not repeat it or supplement 
it here. In addition, nearly all penalty phase 
legal issues raised by J. Carr are discussed as 
needed and disposed of in the R. Carr 
opinion. We therefore merely list them with 
accompanying short responses. 
 
P1. Did the district judge err in refusing to 
sever the penalty phase of defendants' trial? 
A majority of six members of the court 
answers this question yes for reasons 
explained in Section P1 of the R. Carr 
opinion and because of the family 
circumstances argument raised by J. Carr. 
The majority also relies on the prejudice to J. 
Carr flowing from R. Carr's visible handcuffs 
during the penalty phase. One member of the 
court dissents and writes separately on this 
issue. A majority of six members of the court 
agrees that this error requires J. Carr's 
remaining death sentence to be vacated, 
consistent with Section P1 of the R. Carr 
opinion. One member of the court dissents 
and writes separately on this issue. 
 
P2. Despite compliance with K.S.A. 21-
4624(a), was it constitutional error to omit 
the four aggravating circumstances asserted 
by the State from the complaint? To provide 
guidance on remand, the court unanimously 
answers this question no for reasons 
explained in Section P2 of the R. Carr 
opinion. 
 
P3. Did the four aggravating circumstances 
asserted by the State adequately channel the 
jury's discretion in arriving at the sentence of 
death? To provide guidance on remand, the 
court unanimously answers this question yes 
for reasons explained in Section P3 of the R. 
Carr opinion. 
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P4. Does the unavailability of a transcript of 
the jury view deprive J. Carr of a meaningful 
opportunity for appellate review of his death 
sentence? To provide guidance on remand, 
the court unanimously answers this question 
no for reasons explained in Section P4 of the 
R. Carr opinion. 
 
P5. Does K.S.A. 21-4624(c)'s allowance of 
testimonial hearsay (a) offend the heightened 
reliability standard applicable in death 
penalty cases, or (b) violate the Confrontation 
Clause of the United State Constitution and 
Crawford v. Washington? To provide 
guidance on remand, the court unanimously 
answers the first question no for reasons 
explained in Section P5 of the R. Carr 
opinion. To provide further guidance on 
remand, the Court unanimously answers the 
second question yes for reasons explained in 
Section P5 of the R. Carr opinion. 
 
P6. Did the district judge err in excluding 
mitigating evidence of (a) likelihood of 
parole, or (b) the anticipated impact of J. 
Carr's execution? To provide guidance on 
remand, the court unanimously answers the 
first question no for reasons explained in 
Section P6 of the R. Carr opinion. To provide 
further guidance on remand, in Section P6 of 
the R. Carr opinion, the court discusses the 
standard that should govern consideration if 
the second question arises again. 
 
P7. Did the district judge err by permitting 
the State's rebuttal witness to testify that he 
had consulted other experts and that they 
agreed with his opinion? To provide 
guidance on remand, in Section P7 of the R. 
Carr opinion, the court discusses the standard 
that should govern consideration if this 
question arises again. 
 
P8. Did the district judge err in denying an 
opportunity for surrebuttal testimony? For 
reasons explained in Section P8 of the R. Carr 
opinion, the court unanimously agrees that 
the district judge abused his discretion. The 
court declines to reach the issue of 
harmlessness because of the necessity of 
remand. 
 
P9. Must J. Carr's sentencing on his 
noncapital convictions have occurred before 
the penalty phase of his trial, and, if so, 
should the jury have been informed of the 
sentences he would serve if he were not 
sentenced to death? For reasons explained in 
Section P9 of the R. Carr opinion, the court 
declines to reach the merits of the first part of 
this question because it is moot and, to 
provide guidance on remand, unanimously 
answers the second part of the question no. 
P10. Did the district judge err in failing to 
instruct the jury that the existence of 
mitigating factors need not be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt? To provide guidance on 
remand, for reasons explained in Section P10 
of the R. Carr opinion, a majority of five 
members of the court answers this question 
yes. Two members of the court dissent, and 
one of them writes separately for the two on 
this issue. 
 
P11. Did the district judge err by failing to 
instruct jurors that "the crime" to be 
considered when evaluating aggravating 
circumstances was capital murder? In Section 
P11 of the R. Carr opinion, we discuss this 
issue to provide guidance on remand. 
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P12. Was the jury instruction on the role of 
mercy clearly erroneous? To provide 
guidance on remand, for reasons explained in 
Section P12 of the R. Carr opinion, the court 
unanimously answers this question no. 
 
P13. Did the wording of Instruction 10, when 
read with the verdict forms, misstate the law 
on the need for jury unanimity on mitigating 
factors not outweighing aggravating factors? 
To provide guidance on remand, for reasons 
explained in Section P13 of the R. Carr 
opinion, the court unanimously answers this 
question yes. 
 
P14. Must J. Carr's death sentence be vacated 
because a fact necessary to imposition of the 
penalty—his age of 18 or older at the time of 
the capital crimes—was not submitted to the 
jury or found beyond a reasonable doubt? For 
reasons explained in Section P14 of the R. 
Carr opinion, the court declines to reach the 
merits of this issue because the situation that 
prompted it is unlikely to arise again on 
remand. 
 
P15. Does K.S.A. 21-3205 authorize 
punishing an aider and abettor the same as a 
principal? In Section P16 of the R. Carr 
opinion, the court declines to reach the merits 
of this issue because the record on appeal 
does not demonstrate that R. Carr was 
convicted of capital murder as an aider and 
abettor. This is also true of J. Carr, and no 
further discussion of the issue is warranted in 
this opinion. 
 
P16. Is the death penalty an 
unconstitutionally disproportionate 
punishment as applied to aiders and abettors 
of capital murder under Section 9 of the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights? In 
Section P17 of the R. Carr opinion, the court 
declines to reach the merits of this issue 
because the record on appeal does not 
demonstrate that R. Carr was convicted of 
capital murder as an aider and abettor. This is 
also true of J. Carr, and no further discussion 
of the issue is warranted in this opinion. 
 
P17. Was the penalty phase infected by 
prosecutorial misconduct? J. Carr argues that 
one prosecutor's multiple references to his 
unadjudicated criminal conduct and his 
jailhouse bragging about shooting the 
Birchwood victims and the crude reason for 
raping one of the female victims were 
misconduct. Even though one such reference 
during closing argument was the subject of a 
successful objection and an order for the jury 
to disregard it, J. Carr argues the damage was 
incurable. Defense counsel's earlier objection 
suggesting that the prosecutor could not refer 
to such material without being able to "prove 
it up" had been overruled. This objection 
probably should have been sustained by 
Judge Clark. For reasons explained in Section 
P18 of the R. Carr opinion, the court declines 
to reach the further merits of this issue 
because the situations that prompted it are 
unlikely to arise again on remand. 
 
P18. Do verdict forms such as those used in 
this case pose a threat of double jeopardy? 
For reasons explained in Section P19 of the 
R. Carr opinion, the court declines to reach 
the merits of this issue because it is unripe. 
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P19. Does Kansas' execution protocol protect 
against unnecessary pain? For reasons 
explained in Section P20 of the R. Carr 
opinion, the court declines to reach the merits 
of this issue because it is unripe. 
 
CONCLUSION FOR PENALTY PHASE 
 
Because the district judge's failure to sever 
the penalty phase of defendants' trial violated 
J. Carr's Eighth Amendment right to an 
individualized sentencing determination and 
cannot be deemed harmless error, the death 
sentence for J. Carr's remaining K.S.A. 21-
3439(a)(6) conviction for the murders of 
Heather M., Aaron S., Brad H., and Jason B. 
is vacated. The case is remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
*** 
BEIER, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent 
from two of the majority's rulings on the guilt 
phase of Jonathan Carr's trial: cumulative 
error and sufficiency of evidence on Count 
41. 
 
As discussed in my separate opinion in 
Reginald Carr's appeal, two of the district 
judge's errors—failure to sever the guilt 
phase of the defendants' trial and rejection of 
the reverse Batson peremptory challenge—
may have been reversible standing alone. 
Even if the court is unwilling to go that far 
today, when these two errors are considered 
with the six other J. Carr errors upon which 
the court unanimously agrees—erroneous 
instructions on the sex-crime based capital 
murders, multiplicity of the multiple-
homicide based capital murders, lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction for the victim-on-
victim sex charges, automatic exclusion of 
expert testimony on the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications, erroneous 
instruction on eyewitness certainty, and 
erroneous instruction on aiding and 
abetting—and Judge Paul Clark's refusal to 
grant J. Carr's motion for mistrial after 
opening statements, reversal of all of J. Carr's 
convictions under the cumulative error 
doctrine is unavoidable. Despite weighty 
evidence, there was simply too much 
pervasive and interrelated error in the guilt 
phase of J. Carr's trial for me to be confident 
in the outcome. 
 
I also would hold, for the reasons stated in my 
separate opinion in the R. Carr appeal, that 
the evidence supporting Holly G.'s digital 
self-rape under Count 41 was insufficient to 
convict J. Carr as a principal. This would 
mean that Count 42 can stand, rather than 
being reversed as multiplicitous. 
 
LUCKERT, and JOHNSON, JJ., join the 
foregoing concurring and dissenting 
opinion. 
 
* * * 
 
JOHNSON, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part: I join the separate opinion 
authored by Justice Beier, but I write 
separately because I believe that the district 
court erred in refusing to change the venue of 
the trial and that this defendant's felony 
murder conviction should be reversed for 
want of sufficient evidence. 
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The district court ignored statistically valid 
evidence that prejudice against the defendant 
was pervasive throughout Sedgwick County 
to the extent that one could not expect to find 
an unbiased jury pool in that community. My 
rationale in this case is the same as set forth 
in my separate opinion in codefendant 
Reginald Carr's opinion, which I adopt here 
by reference.  
 
Specific to this case, however, I cannot find 
in the record sufficient competent evidence 
from which a rational jury could have found 
J. Carr guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the felony murder of Linda Ann Walenta. 
Instead of basing its prosecution upon proven 
facts and the relevant inferences that could 
reasonably be drawn from those proven facts, 
the State relied on speculation as to what 
might have happened. 
 
As with the change of venue issue, the 
sufficiency of the evidence issue involves the 
defendant's constitutionally guaranteed 
individual rights. The Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution requires the State to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and 
every element necessary to constitute the 
crime charged. While that right emanates 
from the "people's document," the 
constitution, its enforcement will not always 
be publicly applauded. Nevertheless, it is 
incumbent upon this court to make the State 
comply with its constitutional burden of 
proof, without regard to the popularity of the 
result. 
 
As the majority notes, the defense complains 
of impermissible "inference-stacking." This 
court has previously tried to explain that 
prohibition by stating that "inferences may be 
drawn only from facts established," that is, 
inferences may not rest upon another 
inference. But here, the majority appears to 
focus on its notion of the difference between 
direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, 
which leads it to recite the familiar mantra 
that even the most serious crime may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. Then, the 
majority declares that circumstantial proof is 
not the same as impermissible inference-
stacking.  
 
Certainly, I cannot quibble with the notion 
that just because the State's case is based on 
circumstantial evidence does not mean that 
the State is relying on impermissible 
inference-stacking. But that statement does 
not answer the question presented here. We 
are looking at the quality of the evidence, 
rather than the type of evidence. To support a 
conviction, the evidence must be competent 
evidence, even if it is circumstantial in 
nature. In Williams, 229 Kan. at 648, we 
noted that "[c]onvictions based upon 
circumstantial evidence . . . can present a 
special challenge to the appellate court" when 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
because we only permit juries "to draw 
justifiable inferences from proven 
circumstances and established facts." 
Williams set forth an alternative explanation 
of the prohibited practice of inference-
stacking by specifically placing it in the 
context of circumstantial evidence: "'[W]here 
reliance is placed upon circumstantial 
evidence, the circumstances in question must 
themselves be proved and cannot be inferred 
or presumed from other circumstances.'" 
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Here, to get to the circumstances that would 
support a reasonable inference that the 
defendant committed the crime of felony 
murder, one has to make presumptions and 
inferences from other circumstances. 
 
When reviewing whether the record contains 
substantial competent evidence, I find it 
helpful to first review what elements or 
claims the State was required to prove in 
order to obtain a constitutional conviction on 
the charged crime. As noted, the charged 
crime was felony murder, the definition of 
which is located in the first-degree murder 
statute and requires "the killing of a human 
being committed . . . in the commission of, 
attempt to commit, or flight from an 
inherently dangerous felony as defined in 
K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto." 
K.S.A. 21-3401(b). In this case, the State 
alleged that the underlying felony was an 
attempt to commit aggravated robbery upon 
Walenta. "Robbery is the taking of property 
from the person or presence of another by 
force or by threat of bodily harm." K.S.A. 21-
3426. That crime is an aggravated robbery if 
the robber is armed with a dangerous weapon 
or inflicts bodily harm upon a person during 
the robbery. "An attempt is any overt act 
toward the perpetration of a crime done by a 
person who intends to commit such crime but 
fails in the perpetration thereof or is 
prevented or intercepted in executing such 
crime." K.S.A. 21-3301(a). 
 
But the State did not allege that J. Carr killed 
Walenta or that he attempted to rob her. 
Rather, the State's felony-murder prosecution 
of J. Carr was based on the theory that he 
aided and abetted his brother, R. Carr, who 
was the person that killed Walenta while 
attempting to rob her. K.S.A. 21-3205(1) 
provides that "[a] person is criminally 
responsible for a crime committed by another 
if such person intentionally aids, abets, 
advises, hires, counsels or procures the other 
to commit the crime." To be criminally 
responsible, a defendant must aid and abet 
the principal either before or during the 
commission of the crime and, most 
importantly, the aider and abettor must 
possess the intent to promote or assist in the 
commission of the charged crime. Mere 
association with the principal who actually 
committed the crime or mere presence in the 
vicinity of the crime is insufficient to 
establish guilt as an aider and abettor. In other 
words, one is not criminally responsible for 
accidentally aiding and abetting the 
commission of a crime; the defendant has to 
know that the principal is going to commit the 
charged crime and possess the same criminal 
intent as the principal in order to be convicted 
of that crime as an aider and abettor. 
 
With the foregoing in mind, the prosecutor's 
theory of prosecution in this case required the 
State to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt that J. Carr intentionally drove R. Carr 
to the site of the crime, with the intent to 
promote or assist R. Carr in taking property 
from Walenta by force or by threat of bodily 
injury while armed with the handgun that J. 
Carr may or may not have provided, and that 
during the armed robbery attempt, R. Carr 
killed Walenta. 
 
The obvious first hurdle for the prosecution 
was that it had absolutely no proof that R. 
Carr was attempting an aggravated robbery 
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when he shot Walenta, rather than attempting 
a kidnapping or even murder. If his brother 
was not attempting an aggravated robbery, 
then J. Carr could not have been criminally 
responsible for felony murder based on 
aiding and abetting a nonexistent underlying 
felony. Nevertheless, I will continue the 
analysis as if R. Carr was attempting an 
aggravated robbery. 
 
At this point, it might be helpful to briefly 
discuss the difference between circumstantial 
evidence and direct evidence. The dictionary 
definition of "direct evidence" is particularly 
germane here because it also places the term 
in the context of an inference or presumption, 
to-wit: "Evidence that is based on personal 
knowledge or observation and that, if true, 
proves a fact without inference or 
presumption." Ironically, the majority 
provides an excellent example of the 
difference. 
 
After describing Walenta's personal 
observation that the gunman emerged from 
the passenger seat of a light-colored car 
which pulled away from its parking place 
immediately after the shooting, the majority 
declares that "[a] juror need only make one 
inference from these facts to arrive at a 
finding that there was another person driving 
the car that followed her." Slip op. at 36. 
Walenta's statement of what she personally 
knew from her own observation was direct 
evidence of the following facts: The gunman 
exited from the passenger side of a vehicle; 
the vehicle was light-colored; and the vehicle 
pulled away from its parking place 
immediately after the shooting. One need 
draw no inference or make any presumption 
for those facts to be established. But the 
conclusion that someone other than the 
gunman was the driver of the vehicle is 
circumstantial evidence. It is only proved by 
inferring or presuming from Walenta's direct 
testimony that if the gunman was the only 
person in the vehicle, it could not have pulled 
away without the gunman being in the 
vehicle. 
 
But, of course, the direct evidence from 
Walenta does not establish the elements of 
felony murder against J. Carr. The only other 
persons who were in a position to personally 
observe the crime and have personal 
knowledge of any fact that would not require 
an inference or presumption for proof are the 
gunman and vehicle driver, alleged to be R. 
Carr and J. Carr. Neither brother testified or 
gave a statement admitting that J. Carr drove 
the car to assist R. Carr in an armed robbery. 
Even the permissible inference from direct 
evidence that the majority points out—that 
someone other than the shooter was driving 
the car—is insufficient to prove the elements 
of felony murder outlined above. To get to 
the elements of the crime, one will need more 
circumstantial evidence from which to draw 
reasonable inferences. 
 
In my view, a circumstance that was 
absolutely essential for the prosecution to 
establish to permit a rational jury to convict 
J. Carr of felony murder based upon the 
State's theory of prosecution was that J. Carr 
was driving the light-colored car that 
Walenta observed. But that circumstantial 
evidence—that J. Carr was driving the light-
colored car—was not established with proven 
facts. There was no witness that identified J. 
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Carr as the vehicle driver. No witness even 
saw the driver to be able to provide a 
description that could be matched against J. 
Carr. 
 
The only way to establish that J. Carr was 
driving the car used in the crime is to presume 
that circumstance based upon other 
circumstantial evidence. For instance, 
Tronda Adam's testimony placing J. Carr 
with R. Carr not long after Walenta was shot 
is not direct evidence that they were together 
during the shooting. Contrary to the 
majority's characterization, that testimony 
was circumstantial because Adams did not 
personally observe the brothers commit the 
crime together. To be relevant to J. Carr's 
prosecution for felony murder, the jury had to 
infer that, if the brothers were together after 
the shooting, they must have been together 
during the shooting. Then, from the 
circumstance that the brothers were together 
during the shooting, the jury would need to 
infer that J. Carr was driving the light-colored 
car at the scene of the crime. From the 
circumstance that J. Carr was driving the 
vehicle at the scene of the crime, the jury 
would have to infer that he was doing so in 
order to knowingly promote or assist his 
brother in the commission of a crime. And 
because the State said so, the jury would need 
to infer or presume that the intended crime 
was aggravated robbery, rather than some 
other crime such as kidnapping. If that is not 
inference-stacking, I must confess that the 
concept must be incomprehensible to me. 
 
Likewise, the testimony describing the 
vehicle the brothers were using the day of the 
shooting required further presumptions and 
inference-stacking by the jury, 
notwithstanding the majority's emphatic 
denial that it did. Adams did not see the 
brothers in the car together at the scene of the 
Walenta killing. Therefore, her testimony did 
not prove a fact that was relevant to the 
felony-murder elements without a further 
inference or presumption, i.e., it was not 
direct evidence. Pointedly, no witness 
provided information, such as a license tag 
number, from which the owner of the light-
colored car at the crime scene could be 
determined. No one even described the make 
and model of the car carrying the gunman. 
All the jury could do with Adams' testimony 
was to speculate that the light-colored car 
observed by Walenta was the same car that 
Adams saw the brothers in at other times and 
further infer that the brothers were still 
together in that car at the crime scene, and 
further presume that the unseen driver of the 
light-colored car at the scene of the crime was 
J. Carr, who presumably was knowingly 
assisting his brother in committing an 
aggravated robbery. 
 
Likewise, Adams' testimony about the gun 
does nothing to boost the State's case. Her 
"direct observations" about what transpired 
with the weapon at times other than the 
shooting, provides absolutely no insight into 
the elements of the felony-murder charge, 
unless the jury simply guesses that J. Carr 
must have given the weapon to R. Carr and 
then presume that, in doing so, J. Carr knew 
that R. Carr was planning to use the weapon 
to commit an aggravated robbery. 
 
Even if one eschews the term "inference-
stacking," I cannot find that the jury had 
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sufficient proven circumstances and 
established facts to justify an inference that J. 
Carr aided and abetted the felony murder of 
Walenta. Without sufficient competent 
evidence to support a constitutionally valid 
conviction, this court has no choice but to 
reverse the conviction. 
 
Before concluding, however, I want to briefly 
discuss my worst nightmare, i.e., that our 
inference-stacking, guilt-by-association, 
character-propensity-reasoning decision 
in State v. McBroom, would be applied 
beyond its facts as establishing precedent for 
upholding convictions based upon 
insufficient evidence. The majority cites to 
McBroom to support its declaration that "the 
evidence against J. Carr on the Birchwood 
incident would naturally have reinforced the 
evidence on the Walenta incident." Slip op. at 
37. Why do I find that reasoning faulty? Let 
me count the ways. 
 
First, I would find that it would be quite 
unnatural for the jury to use the evidence on 
one charge to reinforce or influence its 
decision on another charge, because the trial 
judge specifically told the jurors not to do 
that. PIK Crim. 3d 68.07, which the judge 
followed in jury instruction No. 3, instructs a 
jury as follows: 
 
"Each crime charged against the 
defendant is a separate and distinct 
offense. You must decide each charge 
separately on the evidence and law 
applicable to it, uninfluenced by your 
decision as to any other charge. The 
defendant may be convicted or 
acquitted on any or all of the offenses 
charged. Your finding as to each 
crime charged must be stated in a 
verdict form signed by the Presiding 
Juror." 
 
Second, as noted above, mere association 
with a principal actor is insufficient to 
establish criminal responsibility as an aider 
and abettor, even if the defendant is also 
merely present at the crime scene. 
Accordingly, guilty-by-association at another 
crime scene cannot comport with the 
constitutional requirement for the State to 
prove each and every element of the charged 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Third, we at least pay lip service to the notion 
that juries should not be permitted to convict 
a defendant based upon character propensity 
reasoning 
 
"In the criminal context, the State 
cannot present evidence that a 
defendant committed a specific bad 
act on another occasion solely to 
establish a bad character propensity 
as proof that the defendant must have 
committed the currently charged 
crime, i.e., defendant did bad before, 
therefore defendant must have done 
bad now."  
 
That is precisely the reasoning the majority is 
using; J. Carr did bad at the Birchwood 
incident so he must have done bad at the 
Walenta incident. 
 
Fourth, "[u]nder our theory of criminal 
jurisprudence in this nation, the defendant is 
clothed with a presumption of innocence 
until he is proven to be guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the State." Allowing the 
State to use evidence of one crime to 
"reinforce" its proof of another crime 
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denigrates the defendant's presumption of 
innocence. In other words, presuming that a 
defendant did the charged crime because 
there is evidence that he committed another 
crime sounds more like bad people are 
clothed with a presumption of guilt. 
 
Fifth, as I noted above, the State is 
constitutionally required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prove each and every element 
necessary to constitute the charged crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Allowing the 
State's proof of the charged crime to rely on 
its having proved another crime reduces its 
constitutional burden of proof and violates 
the defendant's right to due process. 
 
Finally, it is no answer to say that the jury has 
spoken and an appellate court should not 
interfere with that decision. To the contrary, 
our failure to interfere when presented with a 
constitutional violation is an abdication of 
our role in the justice system. The jury is a 
factfinder; it is not charged with the 
responsibility (or authority) to decide 
constitutional questions. Where the jury's 
factfinding exceeds constitutional 
boundaries, such as where it convicts a 
defendant for the charged crime based upon 
evidence that the defendant committed 
another crime, this court must rectify the 
violation. 
 
In sum, the defendant's conviction for felony 
murder was unsupported by substantial 
competent evidence and should be reversed. 
 
* * * 
 
BILES, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part: I agree Jonathan Carr's 
sentencing must be reversed and remanded 
for new proceedings because the district 
court failed to sever the cases following the 
convictions. I write separately to note my 
disagreement with the majority's dicta in 
which it adopts a section in Reginald Carr's 
opinion entitled "P10. Burden of Proof on 
Mitigating Factors." The majority holds J. 
Carr's sentence was imposed in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution because the district court failed 
to explicitly instruct the jury that mitigating 
circumstances need not be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. I disagree. 
 
As noted in more detail in my dissent in State 
v. Gleason, the majority's conclusion defies 
the United States Supreme Court's 
established Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and lacks any persuasive 
analysis articulating why the circumstances 
in this case justify a departure from that 
precedent. The issue for Eighth Amendment 
purposes is "whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury has applied the 
challenged instruction in a way that prevents 
the consideration of constitutionally relevant 
evidence." The majority's conclusion is that a 
per se violation of the Eighth Amendment 
occurs if a jury instruction correctly states 
that the State bears the burden of proving 
aggravating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt but fails to affirmatively 
state that mitigation evidence need not be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
But this alone cannot justify reversal under 
controlling Eighth Amendment precedent. 
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The next step must be to decide in the 
absence of the instruction whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury has 
applied the challenged instruction in a way 
that prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant evidence. The 
majority is wrong when it cuts the analysis 
short and concludes the failure to simply 
instruct the jury on mitigation forces an 
automatic reversal. 
 
The Eighth Amendment does not compel our 
directive in State v. Kleypas, that any 
mitigating circumstance instruction must 
inform the jury that mitigating circumstances 
need not be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. A finding that J. Carr's jury 
instructions did not conform to the Kleypas 
requirement is not an adequate basis for 
concluding J. Carr's federal Eighth 
Amendment rights were violated and reversal 
is required. 
 
I dissent from that portion of the opinion. 
 
MORITZ, J., joins the dissenting portion 
of the foregoing concurring and dissenting 
opinion. 
 
* * * 
 
MORITZ, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part: I write separately for 
several reasons, all of which are fully 
explained in the Reginald Carr appeal, State 
v. Carr. Rather than repeat that full 
explanation here, I will simply summarize 
those points on which I concur with and 
dissent from the majority opinion. 
 
First, I concur because while I agree with the 
majority's decision to affirm Jonathan Carr's 
convictions, including one capital murder 
conviction, I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to sever the defendants' 
guilt phase trial. Even considering the joinder 
as error, however, I believe the majority 
properly finds any errors in the conviction 
phase harmless and Jonathan Carr's 
cumulative error argument unpersuasive. 
Therefore, I concur with the majority opinion 
affirming Jonathan Carr's convictions, 
including one capital murder conviction. 
 
Second, and more significantly, I dissent 
from the majority's decision to reverse and 
remand Jonathan Carr's death sentence. I 
would find the district court did not err in 
refusing to sever the defendants' penalty 
phase trial. But even considering a joinder 
error in the penalty phase, I would affirm the 
jury's imposition of the death penalty for 
Jonathan Carr. As more fully detailed in my 
concurring and dissenting opinion in 
Reginald Carr's appeal, I am convinced the 
mitigating evidence simply pales in 
comparison to the aggravating 
circumstances. I would hold beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury's decision to 
impose the death penalty was not attributable 
to any joinder error below. 
 
Additionally, I join that portion of Justice 
Biles' separate opinion dissenting from the 
majority's "alternative" holding that the 
district court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury that mitigating circumstances need not 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Ultimately, I am convinced Jonathan Carr 
received a fair trial and the jury imposed a 
sentence of death because it understood that 
the horrendous circumstances called for that 
sentence. Because I would affirm Jonathan 
Carr's death sentence, I dissent.
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“Carr Brothers’ Death Sentences to be Reviewed By U.S. Supreme 
Court” 
Associated Press 
Roxana Hegeman 
March 30, 2015 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
hear Kansas’ appeal seeking to reinstate 
death sentences for Jonathan and Reginald 
Carr, brothers convicted of robbing, sexually 
assaulting and shooting five people in a 
Wichita soccer field in 2000. 
 
The court also agreed to review a separate 
Kansas Supreme Court decision overturning 
the death sentence of a man convicted of 
killing a couple in Great Bend in 2004. 
 
The justices said they will review the Kansas 
high court’s rulings that threw out the 
sentences for the Carr brothers and for Sidney 
Gleason. The Kansas court hasn’t upheld a 
death sentence since a new capital 
punishment law was enacted in 1994. The 
state’s last executions, by hanging, took place 
in 1965. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider 
instructions given to jurors in the sentencing 
phase of capital trials about evidence 
favorable to the defendants as well as 
whether sentencing the Carr brothers together 
violated their rights. 
 
Sedgwick County District Attorney Marc 
Bennett said the Carr case is “important to us, 
important to the victims, important to this 
community. In terms of legal importance, 
well, I guess that is in the eye of the beholder. 
The U.S. Supreme Court obviously thought it 
merited their attention.” 
 
Sarah Johnson, an attorney with the state 
capital appellate defender’s office who 
represents Gleason and Jonathan Carr, said 
they were “honestly a little surprised” that the 
court agreed to hear the cases. 
 
“We don’t think this is an issue that really is 
worthy of the U.S. Supreme Court’s time and 
attention, but we are confident that once they 
get into it, they will recognize that the Kansas 
Supreme Court acted well within its 
discretion,” Johnson said. 
 
The Kansas Supreme Court in July upheld 
one conviction of capital murder with respect 
to the Carr brothers but overturned their death 
sentences. That same month, the court also 
upheld Gleason’s conviction but reversed his 
death sentence. 
 
“We have carefully analyzed the opinions of 
the Kansas Supreme Court and we do not 
believe they have correctly applied the U.S. 
Constitution,” Kansas Attorney General 
Derek Schmidt said Monday in a statement. 
“I am encouraged the U.S. Supreme Court 
has agreed to review the cases.” 
 
The Carr brothers broke into a Wichita home 
in December 2000 and forced the five people 
there to have sex with each other and later to 
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withdraw money from ATMs. All five later 
were taken to a snow-covered soccer field 
and shot. 
 
Four of them – 29-year-old Aaron Sander, 
27-year-old Brad Heyka, 26-year-old Jason 
Befort and 25-year-old Heather Muller – 
died. One woman survived a gunshot wound 
to the head and ran through the snow to seek 
help. 
 
Gleason was convicted for the 2004 murders 
of Mikiala Martinez and her boyfriend, 
Darren Wornkey. Martinez was a potential 
witness against Gleason in an earlier crime. 
 
The cases will be argued in Washington in the 
fall. 
 
Even if the Kansas Supreme Court decision 
stands, the Carrs remain convicted of murder 
and other crimes that will keep them in prison 
for decades, Bennett said last summer 
following the state Supreme Court’s 
decision. 
 
“Best case scenario, we’re talking 70, 80 
years from now before either would see a 
parole board,” he said. 
 
The most important issue in the case, Bennett 
said at the time, is whether the judge caused 
an unfair situation by trying the brothers 
together instead of separately. 
 
“Our argument would be however you would 
have tried it, however it was done, the 
evidence was such that it would have made 
no functional difference, (that) any jury, 
however it was empaneled, would have 
reached the same conclusion,” Bennett said.
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“How the ‘Wichita Massacre’ Became a Factor in the Kansas Gov’s 
Race” 
The National Review 
Ryan Lovelace 
October 22, 2014 
One of the most horrendous crimes in 
Kansas’s history has become an issue in the 
state’s hard-fought gubernatorial race. 
Jonathan and Reginald Carr received death 
sentences from the state more than a decade 
ago for a crime spree that involved rape, 
robbery, and murder, and culminated in the 
“Wichita Massacre” killings of four people 
and a dog. When the Kansas Supreme Court 
overturned the brothers’ death sentences in a 
6–1 decision earlier this summer, the reprieve 
drew the ire of Republican governor Sam 
Brownback, who’s now running for 
reelection.  
 
At a debate on Tuesday, Brownback cited the 
case as an example of the importance of 
judicial appointments. “[Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate] Paul Davis wants to 
continue to appoint liberal judges to that 
court; I want to appoint judges who will 
interpret the law, not rewrite it as they choose 
to see it to be,” Brownback said. “One of the 
supreme-court justices [involved in the case] 
even hosted a fundraiser for Paul Davis in her 
home. I find that wrong. It’s something that 
shouldn’t happen.”  
 
That fundraiser was held at the home of 
Justice Carol Beier, who was appointed to the 
court in 2003 by former Democratic governor 
Kathleen Sebelius. Beier was actually the 
lone dissent from the Carr brothers’ death 
sentences, but only because she thought the 
death-penalty reprieve didn’t go far enough 
— she wanted a reversal of their convictions.  
 
Brownback released an ad before Tuesday’s 
debate hitting Davis for siding with the 
liberal justices. 
 
At the end of the debate, Davis pushed back 
against Brownback’s claim. “When I decided 
to get into this race I knew that Governor 
Brownback would run an ugly campaign of 
personal attacks, but I didn’t think the ads 
could get any sleazier,” Davis said. “I turned 
on my television this morning and I saw an 
ad that is running linking me to the Carr 
brothers’ murders. I knew one of the victims 
of the Carr brothers. Governor, you trying to 
exploit that terrible tragedy to help get 
reelected is disgraceful.” 
 
Brownback has faced criticism for his own 
judicial choices: In August, he appointed 
Caleb Stegall, a first-year state court-of-
appeals judge, to Kansas’s highest court. 
Stegall previously worked as general counsel 
for Brownback and for conservative group 
Americans for Prosperity, leading Davis to 
knock the pick as an example of 
Brownback’s rewarding a political ally over 
choosing someone with more judicial 
experience.  
Much of the race has focused on debates over 
conservative policy choices, on taxes and 
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social issues, that Brownback has made 
during his first term as governor. 
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“Kansas Court Overturns Brother’s Death Sentences” 
CBS 
July 25, 2014 
 
The Kansas Supreme Court on Friday 
overturned the death sentences of two 
brothers convicted of capital murder in a 
crime spree in Wichita in 2000 including 
robbery, rape, forced sex and four fatal 
shootings in a snow-covered soccer field. 
 
The court also struck down three of the four 
capital murder convictions each against 
Jonathan and Reginald Carr. It upheld one 
capital murder conviction for each of them. 
 
Their cases will return to Sedgwick County 
District Court for further hearings. 
 
The court's majority overturned their death 
sentences because the presiding judge did not 
hold separate proceedings for each man. In 
overturning most of their capital convictions, 
the majority said the instructions to jurors 
were flawed. 
 
The justices on Friday issued a separate 
ruling for each brother. 
 
The Carr brothers' crimes are among the most 
notorious in the state since the 1959 slayings 
of a western Kansas family that inspired the 
classic book, "In Cold Blood." 
 
The victims in the December 2000 attacks 
that culminated in a bloody scene in a snowy 
field were: Aaron Sander, 29; Brad Heyka, 
27; Jason Befort, 26; and Heather Muller, 25. 
Another woman who was shot in the head 
survived and ran naked through the snow to 
seek help, becoming a key witness at the 
brothers' trial. 
 
Prosecutors said the five friends were in a 
Wichita home when two armed intruders 
forced them to engage in sex with each other 
and later made them withdraw money from 
automatic teller machines. The two women 
were raped repeatedly before the five were 
taken to the soccer field and shot while they 
were kneeling. 
 
The Carr brothers also were convicted of 
first-degree murder in connection with the 
fatal shooting of a 55-year-old cellist, Ann 
Walenta of Wichita, only days before the 
spree that left four dead. 
 
Jonathan Carr, now 34, and Reginald Carr, 
36, were in their early 20s when the crimes 
occurred. Together, they were convicted of 
93 crimes, including rape, aggravated 
kidnapping and aggravated robbery and 
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court 
upheld a total of 57 convictions against them. 
 
Five other convicted murderers, all men, 
remain on death row in Kansas. The state 
Supreme Court last week overturned the 
death sentence of Sidney Gleason in the 
killings of a Great Bend couple in 2004. Last 
year it ordered a new trial for Scott Cheever 
in the shooting of the Greenwood County 
sheriff in 2005, though the U.S. Supreme 
Court later ordered the Kansas court to 
reconsider. 
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Kansas' last legal executions were in 1965, by 
hanging. The current capital punishment law 
was enacted in 1994, but the state's highest 
court has yet to approve any death sentences, 
which has led to criticism from legislators 
and other officials who support the death 
penalty. 
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Montgomery v. Louisiana 
14-7505 
Ruling Below: State v. Montgomery, 141 So.3d 264 (La. 2014), cert granted 
Henry Montgomery has been incarcerated since 1963. Montgomery is serving a mandatory life 
sentence for a murder he committed just 11 days after he turned seventeen years of age. In light 
of Miller v. Alabama, which holds that mandatory sentencing schemes “requiring that all 
children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of 
parole”…violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, Montgomery 
filed a state district court motion to correct his illegal sentence. The trial court denied 
Montgomery’s motion, and on direct writ application, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied 
Montgomery’s application, citing State v. Tate, which held that Miller is not retroactive on 
collateral review to those incarcerated in Louisiana. 
Question Presented: Whether Miller adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on 
collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison? 
 
State of LOUISIANA 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Henry MONTGOMERY 
Defendant 
 
19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge 
January 30, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
Having considered Defendant’s Motion to 
Correct an Illegal Sentence filed in the above 
numbered and captioned cause,  
It is ordered that the motion is DENIED.  
The defendant was convicted of the murder 
of Charles Hurt in February of 1964. At the 
time of the offense, the defendant was 
seventeen years of age. The defendant was 
granted a new trial in 1969, but was found 
guilty again in February of 1969 and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held 
that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
prison without possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.” In order for a new rule to 
overcome the bar to retroactivity on collateral 
review, one of the two Teague exceptions 
must be met. Teague v. Lane. The first 
exception applies when a new rule 
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completely removes a particular punishment 
from the list of punishments that can be 
constitutionally imposed on a class of 
defendants.   
Therefore, it does not satisfy the first 
exception for retroactivity because it does not 
categorically bar all sentences of life 
imprisonment for juveniles. Miller bars only 
those sentences made mandatory by a 
sentencing scheme.  
The second exception applies to “watershed 
rules of criminal procedure implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the 
criminal proceeding.” The holding in Miller 
does not qualify as a “watershed rule,” and 
therefore, does not satisfy the requirements of 
the second exception of Teague.  
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the 
present case does not overcome the general 
bar to retroactivity and the Defendant’s 
motion is DENIED.  
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“The Supreme Court Takes One More Look at Life Sentences for 
Teens” 
Bloomberg 
Matt Stroud 
March 23, 2015 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court added a case to its 
docket on Monday that will determine 
whether juveniles sentenced years ago to life 
without parole should be re-sentenced. The 
latest case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, comes 
in the wake of a 2012 ruling that sentences of 
life without parole for juveniles are 
unconstitutional. About 1,500 people in the 
U.S. remain incarcerated under such 
sentences.   
 
The U.S. had, until recently, been the only 
developed country in the world in which 
people under 18 could be punished with life 
in prison without the possibility of parole (a 
sentence known as juvenile life without 
parole, or JLWOP). For almost a decade, the 
Supreme Court has written opinions that have 
chiseled away at laws allowing—and in some 
cases, mandating—that kids convicted of 
certain crimes such as murder must serve the 
rest of their lives behind bars. 
 
In the 2012 case, Miller v. Alabama, the 
Supreme Court found JLWOP 
unconstitutional and barred future sentences. 
But the justices did not offer guidance as to 
whether the 1,500 prior JLWOP convicts 
should be re-sentenced. That left a question 
on the table: Should the Miller decision be 
retroactive? Should people who have already 
been sentenced to JLWOP be re-sentenced to 
less severe penalties?  
The Supreme Court decided late last year to 
hear arguments about this question in a case 
called Toca v. Louisiana. But after the high 
court agreed to hear the case, the local district 
attorney offered a deal to the plaintiff, George 
Toca: Plea to a lesser charge and be released. 
Toca, who has maintained his innocence, had 
been behind bars more than three decades in 
the notoriously brutal Louisiana State 
Penitentiary known as Angola. He took the 
deal and was freed from prison. 
 
That was good news for him, but it led to his 
Supreme Court case being dropped, leaving 
the question of retroactivity up in the air. The 
Supreme Court's decision to hear 
Montgomery v. Louisiana promises to take 
things out of limbo. 
 
The case involves Henry Montgomery, a 17-
year-old 10th grader who shot and killed a 
Baton Rouge deputy in 1963 while playing 
hooky from school. The Supreme Court will 
hear arguments in Montgomery's case this 
fall. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Baton Rouge Case to Re-Evaluate 
Life Sentences for Murders by Juveniles” 
The Acadiana Advocate 
Joe Gyan Jr. 
March 25, 2015 
Becky Wilson forgave Henry Montgomery 
years ago for the 1963 murder of her father, 
East Baton Rouge Parish sheriff’s deputy 
Charles H. Hurt, but that doesn’t mean she 
wants him to go free. 
Montgomery, 17 years old when Hurt was 
gunned down in a Scotlandville field, has 
been locked up since the day after the killing. 
Next fall, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear 
arguments to decide whether Montgomery, 
now 68, should have a chance to leave prison. 
The justices will weigh whether their June 
2012 decision banning automatic life terms 
for juveniles convicted of murder should 
apply to older cases. 
For Wilson, who lost her father when she was 
9, the answer is clear. 
“Unfortunately, our sentence has no way of 
being overturned or commuted. We live with 
this forever,” Wilson, 60, said from Hope, 
Arkansas. “My mother served a life sentence 
without her husband; my brother, sister and I 
have served a life sentence without our 
father; my children, nieces and nephews have 
served a sentence of never knowing their 
grandfather.” 
Montgomery was convicted and sentenced to 
death in 1964, then retried in 1969 and 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison 
without parole. 
“I don’t feel vindictive toward the man. I feel 
like he got two fair trials,” Wilson said. “I’m 
not upset the death sentence was overturned.” 
Montgomery, who escaped for just a few 
hours with seven others from the East Baton 
Rouge Parish jail in 1966, has been denied 
release four times — in 1971, 1995, 1999 and 
2001, she added. 
“They had more than enough time to consider 
his background,” Wilson said. 
In its 2012 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court 
said by a 5-4 vote that states can no longer 
automatically sentence juveniles convicted of 
murder to life in prison without parole 
without first holding a sentencing hearing to 
consider the defendant’s youth, upbringing, 
circumstances of the crime and other factors. 
The court found that “youth matters for 
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious 
punishments.” In an opinion written by 
Justice Elena Kagan, the court said that 
children simply don’t have the same mental 
capacity as adults, so they should be treated 
differently. The decision noted “children’s 
diminished culpability and heightened 
capacity for change.” 
The ruling, in a case called Miller v. 
Alabama, did not ban juvenile life sentences 
altogether; the high court only outlawed the 
automatic imposition of the sentence. Judges 
 330 
must consider each defendant’s case 
individually, taking into consideration the 
child’s home life and ability to be 
rehabilitated. 
The high court, however, did not say whether 
the decision applied retroactively to inmates 
across the country serving life terms for 
killings they committed when they were 
under 18. 
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and 
Corrections spokeswoman Pam Laborde said 
Tuesday that as of April 2013, there were 332 
offenders in state custody who were 
sentenced to life without parole as juveniles 
for various crimes, including first- and 
second-degree murder and aggravated rape. 
The bulk of them were sentenced before the 
Supreme Court’s ruling. 
Courts in various states have split on whether 
the Miller ruling should be retroactive. 
Supreme courts in Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania and Michigan have ruled that 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision 
should not be applied to cases prior to the 
decision. Intermediate appeals courts in 
Florida and Michigan have ruled the same 
way. 
The Louisiana high court, in a 5-2 decision in 
November 2013, concluded that federal law 
only makes a new ruling from the U.S. 
Supreme Court apply retroactively when 
there is a “substantive” issue decided, such as 
the banning of a kind of punishment entirely 
or a crime deemed unconstitutional. An 
example would be the 2005 abolition of the 
death penalty for juvenile offenders. 
The state Supreme Court found that the 
Miller decision was a procedural one, so it 
does not apply to past cases. 
The Louisiana case centered around Darryl 
Tate, who was 17 when he robbed a man of 
40 cents and shot him in the chest. 
Tate pleaded guilty in Orleans Parish in 1981 
to second-degree murder and was sentenced, 
automatically under state law, to spend the 
rest of his life in prison without hope for 
parole. 
In the Montgomery case, the Louisiana 
Attorney General’s Office — which is 
handling the arguments for the East Baton 
Rouge Parish District Attorney’s Office — 
emphasizes that the Miller decision does not 
bar life sentences without the possibility of 
parole. Instead, it replaced an automatic 
mandate with the requirement to hold a 
hearing. 
Attorney General’s Office spokeswoman 
Laura Gerdes Colligan said the fact that 
Montgomery killed Hurt is not in dispute. 
“The Court did not grant review in this case 
because of anything wrong with the 
underlying murder conviction, but instead to 
resolve an important legal question,” she 
said. “The Attorney General’s Office and the 
East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney’s 
Office will vigorously defend the murder 
conviction and sentence in this case, which 
has been final for 45 years.” 
Mark Plaisance, who will argue at the U.S. 
Supreme Court on Montgomery’s behalf for 
the East Baton Rouge Parish Public 
Defenders Office, said he will make the 
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argument that what the high court did in June 
2012 represented a substantive change in the 
law. 
“Since it’s a substantive change it should 
apply to everyone in that class,” he said. 
The highest courts in Iowa, Mississippi and 
most recently Florida, as well as midlevel 
courts in Illinois and New Hampshire, have 
decided that Miller v. Alabama does apply 
retroactively, and the U.S. Department of 
Justice has agreed. 
Federal circuit courts have also divided on 
the issue, with some tossing out previously 
imposed life sentences and others upholding 
them. 
The U.S. Supreme Court will ultimately have 
to settle the confusion. 
In direct response to the high court’s 2012 
ruling, the Louisiana Legislature approved a 
measure during the 2013 regular session 
requiring a sentencing judge to hold a hearing 
to determine whether the sentence should be 
imposed with or without parole eligibility. If 
a sentence is imposed with eligibility for 
parole, the legislation gives incarcerated 
offenders a shot at freedom after serving 35 
years for first- or second-degree murder, 
according to the legislation that the governor 
signed into law. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded in 
its 2013 decision that state lawmakers never 
intended the law to be read to apply to those 
already sentenced. 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Jeff 
Hughes, Chief Justice Bernette Johnson 
wrote, “Fundamental fairness in the 
administration of justice requires that these 
new laws apply to Darryl Tate, and all 
defendants who are similarly situated in 
Louisiana.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court had agreed last fall 
to decide about retroactivity in the New 
Orleans case of George Toca, which was to 
be heard at the high court later this month. 
But Toca was released from prison earlier 
this year under a plea deal in which he agreed 
to drop his innocence claim in exchange for 
pleading guilty to two counts of armed 
robbery and manslaughter. His sentence was 
equal to the time he had served. 
Toca, who was barely 17 at the time of a fatal 
1984 stickup, spent 31 years in prison. 
In legal filings in that case about the 
retroactivity issue, Orleans Parish District 
Attorney Leon Cannizzaro’s office argued it 
would be nonsensical to ask local judges 
decades after a crime was committed to 
evaluate a juvenile’s capacity to change. 
Advocates for juvenile lifers countered that 
judges could instead look at an inmate’s 
record while behind bars. 
Charles Hurt was 41 and living in Baker 
when he was fatally shot by Montgomery, a 
black Scotlandville High School 10th-grade 
student who was described at the time as 
answering to the nickname “Wolf Man.” 
Montgomery told authorities he “panicked” 
and shot Hurt on Nov. 13, 1963, with a stolen 
.22-caliber pistol after the white officer 
confronted him playing hooky in a wooded 
field near the Anna T. Jordan Recreation 
Center in Scotlandville. 
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A news article in The Morning Advocate 
printed the day after the killing described 
Hurt as the first law enforcement officer in 
East Baton Rouge Parish shot to death in 
three decades. The authorities implemented 
roadblocks and rounded up and jailed more 
than 60 black men during the manhunt. The 
article described the men as being “booked 
for investigation.” 
Defense witnesses at Montgomery’s trials 
characterized him as being quiet, withdrawn 
and a habitual thief. He was described as 
having subnormal intelligence. He pleaded 
not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Wilson said her father was a gentle man who 
had a great rapport and reputation with both 
white and black people. 
She said her family received a condolence 
letter from President John F. Kennedy after 
her father was killed. Kennedy was fatally 
shot a week later in Dallas. 
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“Supreme Court to Weigh Retroactivity of Mandatory JLWOP” 
 
Juvenile Justice Information Exchange 
Gary Gately 
April 5, 2015 
A U.S. Supreme Court decision could forever 
alter the landscape of sentences of mandatory 
juvenile life without parole, potentially 
leading to resentencing hearings for some 
2,100 convicted murderers. 
The high court agreed on March 20 to hear a 
case that could set a precedent on whether its 
landmark 2012 Miller v. Alabama ruling 
applies to cases decided before that ruling. 
In the 5-4 Miller ruling, the court did not 
specify definitively whether the decision 
should apply retroactively, and lower federal 
courts and state courts have been divided on 
the issue. 
If the Supreme Court decides Miller should 
be applied retroactively, those sentenced 
before the ruling to mandatory life without 
parole for murders committed as juveniles 
could receive sentence reviews. Depending 
on the state, they could still be sentenced to 
life without parole, to life with parole 
eligibility after a specified number of years or 
be released, likely for time served, said Emily 
Keller, a staff attorney at the Juvenile Law 
Center in Philadelphia. 
Opponents of mandatory juvenile life without 
parole (JLWOP) hailed the Supreme Court’s 
decision to take up the retroactivity issue on 
a Louisiana case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
expected to be heard this fall. 
“We’re really hopeful that the Supreme Court 
will rule that Miller applies retroactively and 
that the thousands of individuals serving 
these unconstitutional sentences will have an 
opportunity for new sentencing hearings,” 
Keller said. 
Of the court’s decision to take up the case, 
Keller said: “It’s a very hopeful sign; it’s a 
signal that the court thinks this is an 
important issue that needs to be addressed, 
and we’re hopeful that they’ll rule that Miller 
does apply retroactively and that everyone 
does get a chance to receive a constitutional 
sentence.” 
Florida just became the 10th state whose 
Supreme Court ruled Miller v. Alabama 
should apply retroactively. (The other states 
are Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
South Carolina, Texas and Wyoming.) 
Courts in five states — Alabama, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania — 
have ruled Miller does not apply 
retroactively. 
Keller said it’s patently unfair – and 
unconstitutional – to allow when and where a 
conviction took place to determine whether 
someone gets a resentencing hearing. 
“I believe it’s a matter of fairness and justice, 
and whether or not you’re forced to serve an 
unconstitutional sentence shouldn’t depend 
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on the arbitrary date that your conviction 
became final or the state where you reside,” 
she said. 
Heather Renwick, litigation counsel for the 
Washington-based nonprofit Campaign for 
the Fair Sentencing of Youth, also cited the 
split among state court rulings on 
retroactivity. 
“It’s inconsistent treatment across the U.S., 
depending on what state you’re in,” Renwick 
said. “So we’re hoping the U.S. Supreme 
Court will hold that Miller v. Alabama is 
retroactive so that every child sentenced 
under a mandatory sentencing scheme to die 
in prison will be afforded a second chance to 
demonstrate rehabilitation and the capacity to 
re-enter the community.” 
In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
mandatory JLWOP violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and 
unusual punishment.” 
Renwick said that if mandatory JLWOP was 
found to be cruel and unusual by the highest 
court in the land, the standard should apply to 
juveniles sentenced before the ruling. 
Pennsylvania has the highest number of 
prisoners serving mandatory JLWOP 
sentences in the country, with some 500 
inmates serving such sentences, including 
Kenneth C. Crawford III (see related story). 
The state’s juvenile lifers had their hopes for 
a resentencing hearing dashed when the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled 4-3 in 
October 2013 against applying Miller 
retroactively. 
In its ruling in Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania v. Ian Cunningham, the 
Pennsylvania high court stated: 
“Significantly, for present purposes, the 
Miller majority did not specifically address 
the question of whether its holding applies to 
judgments of sentence for prisoners, such as 
Appellant, which already were final as of the 
time of the Miller decision. As such, the 
opinion does not set out the principles 
governing the High Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence.” 
In Michigan, too, with nearly 350 inmates 
serving terms of mandatory JLWOP, the state 
Supreme Court ruled 4-3 in July that Miller 
does not apply retroactively. 
On the day the ruling was handed down, 
Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette 
said in a statement: "Today the Michigan 
Supreme Court upheld the rights of crime 
victims and their families. This ruling should 
bring a measure of peace to the many families 
who struggled with the possibility of painful 
resentencing hearings for cases successfully 
prosecuted decades ago." 
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the appellant in 
the case, Henry Montgomery, received a 
sentence of mandatory JLWOP for 
murdering a police officer in 1963 less than 
two weeks after his 17th birthday. 
A Montgomery v. Louisiana petition to the 
U.S. Supreme Court cited a lower federal 
court ruling and argued that the Miller 
decision is “a substantive constitutional rule 
that mandates courts to implement a new 
procedure in the sentencing of juveniles.” 
 335 
In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed to 
research showing adolescents’ brains are not 
fully developed and that youths are more 
susceptible than adults to peer pressure, more 
reckless and impulsive, more likely to take 
risks and less likely to consider long-term 
consequences. 
The court said life circumstances, including 
trauma, must be taken into account in 
sentencing — and, notably, also found 
juveniles are amenable to rehabilitation, a 
finding often cited by opponents of 
mandatory JLWOP. 
Mishi Faruqee, juvenile justice policy 
strategist at the American Civil Liberties 
Union, noted the United States is the only 
country in the world to sentence juveniles to 
life without parole. (The United Nations 
special investigator on torture, Juan E. 
Méndez, condemned juvenile life without 
parole in a report last month.) 
“A child should never be sentenced to die in 
prison; I mean, they always have that 
capacity for change,” Faruqee said. 
“Part of the nature of being a child is you’re 
still growing and developing who you are, 
and so I think it’s absolutely unacceptable to 
condemn a child to spend the rest of their life 
in prison. And that’s something that the 
whole world has recognized except the 
United States.” 
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“Lives Hang in Limbo: SCOTUS to Hear Case on Whether Ruling 
Prohibiting Mandatory Life Sentences for Juveniles Applies 
Retroactively” 
Louisiana Law Review 
Allison B. Kingsmill 
April 13, 2015 
On March 23, 2015, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana to decide whether 
its ruling in Miller v. Alabama, prohibiting 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles convicted of murder, applies 
retroactively—that is, to inmates convicted 
before the decision was issued. 
In Montgomery, Henry Montgomery was 
convicted of murdering a deputy sheriff when 
he was 17 years old and was automatically 
sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole as required by Louisiana 
law. Consequently, Montgomery was 
sentenced to spend the rest of his life in 
prison without any consideration of his 
youth, the circumstances of the crime, or any 
other mitigating facts. In his petition to the 
Supreme Court, Montgomery claims that his 
sentence subjects him to cruel and unusual 
punishment, which violates the Eighth 
Amendment and the previous Supreme Court 
decision in Miller v. Alabama. 
In Miller, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
cases of two 14 year olds who were convicted 
of murder and sentenced to statutorily 
mandated punishments of life without parole. 
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates 
life in prison without the possibility of parole 
for juvenile offenders. The Court emphasized 
that “[m]andatory life without parole for a 
juvenile precludes consideration of his 
chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” 
Without considering the mitigating facts 
relevant to youth, the Court concluded that 
“such a scheme poses too great a risk of 
disproportionate punishment.” As a result, 
the Court did not categorically bar juvenile 
life sentences without parole but indicated 
that “occasions for sentencing juveniles to 
this harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon.” 
In light of the Miller decision, Montgomery 
filed a motion to correct his illegal sentence, 
arguing that he is entitled to a new sentencing 
hearing with the possibility of parole.[ 
However, the state district court denied 
Montgomery’s motion. Moreover, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court denied 
Montgomery’s writ application, refusing to 
apply Miller retroactively. 
The United States Supreme Court has not 
decided whether to apply Miller 
retroactively. As a result, following Miller, 
the retroactivity issue has divided state and 
federal courts across the country. The 
question before the Court in Montgomery is 
whether Miller applies retroactively to 
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defendants who received statutorily 
mandated life-without-parole sentences 
before the Miller decision was handed down. 
Most state courts, as well as six federal circuit 
courts, have applied Miller retroactively, 
interpreting it as a substantive rule banning 
mandatory life sentences for juveniles. In 
contrast, only four states—Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania—
have ruled against retroactivity, viewing 
Miller as merely an announcement of a new 
procedural rule. 
In determining the retroactivity of Supreme 
Court decisions, courts apply the standards 
established by Teague v. Lane. In Teague, the 
Court held that a new rule will be applied 
retroactively if (1) it places “certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond 
the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe” or (2) creates a 
procedure “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.” Courts holding in favor of 
retroactivity have concluded that Miller falls 
within Teague’s first exception, because it 
“explicitly forecloses the imposition of a 
certain category of punishment—mandatory 
life in prison without the possibility of 
parole—on a specific class of defendants: 
those individuals under the age of 18 when 
they commit the crime of murder.” 
On the other hand, courts ruling against 
retroactivity have reasoned that Miller 
mandated only that a court consider an 
offender’s youth before imposing a particular 
penalty and therefore “simply altered the 
range of permissible methods for determining 
whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole.” 
Amidst the division among states and the 
need for uniformity, the United States 
Supreme Court granted review of 
Montgomery’s case and thereby decided to 
end the uncertainty of Miller’s application. 
The Supreme Court originally agreed in 
December 2014 to consider the issue of 
retroactivity in another Louisiana case, Toca 
v. Louisiana. Similar to Montgomery, 
George Toca received a mandatory-life-
without-parole sentence when he was a 
juvenile. However, after years of 
incarceration, Toca accepted a plea deal with 
prosecutors and was released from prison. 
Consequently, his petition became moot 
before the Supreme Court and was 
automatically dismissed. 
Montgomery and Toca’s petitions represent a 
recurring issue before the Supreme Court and 
present a critical question for juvenile 
offenders already sentenced to life without 
parole: Should they be resentenced?[ 
Prisoners sentenced to life as juveniles 
receive new sentencing hearings across the 
nation, while convicted juveniles like 
Montgomery remain condemned to spend the 
rest of their lives in prison. As a result, 
whether Miller should be applied 
retroactively is an important question that 
must be resolved as soon as possible. 
Whether the Court will apply Miller 
retroactively remains uncertain. However, if 
the Court finds in favor of retroactivity, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Pennsylvania will be most heavily impacted, 
as they will have to review all previously 
mandated life-without-parole sentences for 
juvenile offenders. 
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Luis v. United States 
14-419 
Ruling Below: United States v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. Fla. 2014) 
This case presents an opportunity for the Court to resolve a circuit split on a question of 
fundamental importance to the adversarial system of justice: whether the restraint of untainted 
assets needed to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violates the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Farmer  has expressly held that "[w]hile 
Caplin [& Drysdale, Chtd.] made absolutely clear that there is no Sixth Amendment right for a 
defendant to obtain counsel using tainted funds, [a defendant] still possesses a qualified Sixth 
Amendment right to use wholly legitimate funds to hire the attorney of his choice."  
Addressing a pretrial restraint under 18 U.S.C. § 1345, the Eleventh Circuit in this case upheld a 
preliminary injunction that currently restrains all of petitioner's assets, including undisputedly 
untainted funds needed by her to engage private counsel in her criminal case. Ignoring the Fourth 
Circuit's holding in Farmer and the important and historical distinction between tainted and 
untainted assets, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Caplin to "foreclose" petitioner's constitutional 
challenge to the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted funds she needs to retain counsel of 
choice. 
Question Presented: Does the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted 
assets (those not traceable to a criminal offense) needed to retain counsel of choice violate the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments? 
 
UNITED STATES of America 
Plaintiff - Appellee 
v. 
Sila LUIS 
Defendant – Appellant 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
Decided on May 1, 2014 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
Per Curium: 
A federal grand jury in the Southern District 
of Florida indicted Appellant Sila Luis 
(“Luis”) for her role in an alleged Medicare 
fraud scheme that included kickbacks paid to 
patients who enrolled with her home 
healthcare companies. In addition to charging 
Luis with substantive offenses, the 
indictment included forfeiture allegations 
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pursuant to the general criminal forfeiture 
statute. The government brought this civil 
action to restrain Luis’s assets, including 
substitute property of an equivalent value to 
that actually traceable to the scheme, before 
her criminal trial. 
Federal law grants district courts the 
authority to restrain, pretrial, the assets of 
those accused of certain kinds of fraud. This 
includes the authority to restrain “property of 
equivalent value” to that actually traceable to 
the alleged fraud. Among the enumerated 
offenses is a “Federal health care offense,” 
defined elsewhere to include conspiracy to 
defraud the United States and to commit an 
offense against it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
371, and conspiracy to commit healthcare 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. 
In this separate civil case, the government 
moved to restrain Luis’s assets pretrial, to 
include substitute assets not directly traceable 
to the alleged fraud. After granting a 
temporary restraining order, the district court 
held a hearing on a motion for preliminary 
injunction and ultimately granted the motion. 
Luis appeals that order, arguing she needs her 
funds to pay her criminal defense lawyer and 
that restraining those funds pretrial violates 
her constitutional rights. 
Though we generally review a district court’s 
grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of 
discretion, we review questions of law, such 
as a statute’s constitutionality and whether a 
preliminary injunction violates an 
individual’s constitutional rights, de novo.  
After reviewing the record, reading the 
parties’ briefs and having the benefit of oral 
argument, we affirm the district court’s order 
granting the government’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The district court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing where it 
heard arguments and testimony and found, 
based on the hearing and the indictment, that 
there was probable cause to believe that Luis 
committed an offense requiring forfeiture, 
that she possessed forfeitable assets, and that 
she was alienating those assets. The 
arguments made by Luis in this appeal are 
foreclosed by the United States Supreme 
Court decisions in Kaley v. United States; 
Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United 
States; United States v. Monsanto; and 
United States v. DBB, Inc. Accordingly, we 
affirm the district court’s order granting the 
government’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction. 
AFFIRMED. 
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Criminal Defendants Have 
Right to Hire Lawyers With Frozen Assets” 
The Huffington Post 
Samantha Lachman 
June 8, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court took up a case Monday 
concerning whether the government can deny 
criminal defendants untainted money they 
need to hire an attorney of their choice. 
 
The case, Sila Luis v. United States, will be 
heard in the court's next term starting in the 
fall. Luis was indicted in 2012 on fraud 
charges involving $45 million in allegedly 
illegal Medicare payments. The FBI said that 
Luis, as president of a health care provider, 
paid kickbacks and bribes to Medicare 
patient recruiters and submitted false claims 
for work done on behalf of the beneficiaries. 
 
When federal prosecutors froze her assets, 
Luis sued, arguing that not all her assets were 
connected to the charges and that she needed 
money to hire an attorney. Both a federal 
district judge and federal appeals court ruled 
in the government's favor, saying Luis did not 
have a constitutional right to the funds. 
 
The Justice Department has argued that the 
government could freeze the funds. In its case 
against Luis, the government said it was 
putting assets on hold that would be forfeited 
after the defendant was convicted, because 
she had already spent the tainted money on 
travel and luxury goods. The government has 
argued it was making a forfeitable versus 
nonforfeitable calculation, rather than a 
tainted versus untainted one. 
 
In petitions urging the Supreme Court to take 
up the case, legal experts argued that the 
justices should consider whether Luis' Sixth 
Amendment right to hire counsel of her 
choice should outweigh prosecutorial efforts 
to recover the full value of the alleged fraud. 
 
Last year, the court's justices ruled that 
indicted defendants do not have a right to 
challenge the forfeiture of their assets at a 
hearing in order to hire attorneys to defend 
them. 
 
In a dissenting opinion to that decision, Chief 
Justice John Roberts appeared to foreshadow 
Luis' argument. 
 
“Few things could do more to undermine the 
criminal justice system’s integrity than to 
allow the government to initiate a 
prosecution and then, at its option, disarm its 
presumptively innocent opponent by 
depriving him of his counsel of choice,” 
Roberts wrote. Such a move, he explained, 
would be “fundamentally at odds with our 
constitutional tradition and basic notions of 
fair play.” 
 
Asset forfeiture is increasingly becoming a 
bipartisan cause of concern in Congress, 
though the focus has been more on civil 
forfeiture practices in states and local 
communities. 
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“High Court to Eye ‘Untainted’ Asset Freezes in Criminal Suits” 
Law360 
Jessica Corso 
June 8, 2015 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether 
the government can prevent criminal 
defendants from using funds earned outside 
the scope of an alleged crime to hire private 
defense counsel, agreeing Monday to hear a 
dispute over a Florida woman's alleged $45 
million Medicare fraud scheme. 
 
The nation’s highest court took up an appeal 
of an Eleventh Circuit decision that Sila Luis 
could not free up funds frozen by the 
government that she says she earned fair and 
square, to hire private attorneys for her 
criminal suit. 
 
Luis has been accused of committing 
Medicare fraud and violating the Anti-
Kickback Statute by paying patients who 
used her two at-home health companies so 
that she could bill the government for 
unnecessary or unprovided for services. 
 
The criminal case has been put on hold, 
however, while the government wrangles 
with Luis’ attorneys over just how much 
money they can prevent Luis from accessing. 
The government has frozen Luis’ assets to the 
tune of $45 million — the amount they claim 
her companies earned in the scheme — so 
that they can recoup the full amount should 
she be found guilty. 
 
Luis’ attorneys say that she does not have 
access to that amount of money and that to 
make up for it, the government is digging into 
millions of dollars she earned from private 
insurers. The restraining order thus violates 
the Fifth and Sixth amendments by allowing 
the government to restrain an individual’s 
ability to pay for the best defense possible in 
a criminal trial, her Supreme Court petition 
said. 
 
“The government has no limit on how much 
money it can spend to prosecute someone,” 
Luis’ attorney Howard Srebnick of Black 
Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf PA told 
Law360 on Monday. He noted that the case 
outcome will impact not only his client but 
the entire criminal defense bar, which might 
have difficulty finding paying clients should 
the Supreme Court uphold earlier rulings by 
the Eleventh Circuit and the Florida district 
court. 
 
When U.S. District Court Judge Paul C. Huck 
ruled in June 2013 that the government could 
freeze so-called untainted assets in case it 
wins restitution, he used the example of a 
bank robber who already spent the $100,000 
he stole from the bank. 
 
Say the bank robber has access to another 
$100,000 he earned independently from the 
robbery, Judge Huck posited. 
 
“Should his decision to spend the $100,000 
he stole mean that he is free to hire counsel 
with the other $100,000 when Congress has 
authorized restraint of those substitute 
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assets?” he asked. “The reasonable answer is 
no.” 
 
Monday's decision to consider that same 
question comes a year after the Supreme 
Court ruled that the government could 
prevent defendants from accessing funds 
that allegedly were obtained in the process of 
a crime while their criminal suits are 
ongoing. 
 
  
 345 
“If a Defendant Must Forfeit All Assets, Is Her Right To Counsel 
Violated?” 
The Christian Science Monitor 
Warren Richey 
May 14, 2015 
 
The US Supreme Court is being asked to take 
up a case testing whether federal prosecutors 
are entitled to freeze all the assets of a 
criminal defendant – even when some 
of those assets are not tainted by any crime 
and the funds are needed to pay for a defense 
lawyer.  
The question is whether the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to hire counsel of choice 
should outweigh efforts by prosecutors to 
recover the full value of an alleged fraud on 
the government. 
A petition urging the high court to examine 
the issue is expected to be considered at the 
justices' private conference on Thursday. An 
announcement of whether they will hear the 
case could come as early as Monday. 
The issue is significant because the 
government is increasingly using forfeiture 
as a potent weapon to ensure – literally – that 
crime doesn’t pay. For example, in a 15-
month period in 2012 and 2013, the Justice 
Department seized $1.5 billion and returned 
those assets to 400,000 crime victims, 
including to the US Treasury. 
Most forfeitures involve government claims 
on stolen property or proceeds directly 
traceable to criminal activity. But a growing 
segment of seizures involves using civil 
statutes to freeze financial and other assets 
that are not proceeds of criminal activity or 
otherwise tainted by crime. 
In such cases, prosecutors are seeking to 
freeze – and thus, preserve – untainted, 
substitute assets that the government will be 
able to claim at a later time in the event of a 
conviction. 
Here’s the problem: If that freeze occurs 
before a criminal trial, the defendant may be 
rendered broke and unable to hire a lawyer. 
Critics say such heavy-handed tactics raise 
fundamental questions about fairness, 
property rights, and the right to use one’s own 
money to hire an effective defense lawyer. 
Chief Justice John Roberts touched on this 
issue in a dissenting opinion last year. 
“Few things could do more to undermine the 
criminal justice system’s integrity than to 
allow the government to initiate a 
prosecution and then, at its option, disarm its 
presumptively innocent opponent by 
depriving him of his counsel of choice,” 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote. 
Such a move, he added, would be 
“fundamentally at odds with our 
constitutional tradition and basic notions of 
fair play.” 
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The issue arises in a Miami Medicare fraud 
case. 
In October 2012, Sila Luis, president of two 
heath-care companies, was indicted on 
charges that she and others defrauded the 
Medicare program of $45 million during a 
six-year period. 
Investigators said bribes and kickbacks were 
paid to prospective patients who agreed to 
sign up for home health care they did not 
need or never received. 
On the same day as the indictment, 
prosecutors filed a civil action against Ms. 
Luis asking a federal judge to immediately 
freeze all her assets up to $45 million. 
Luis’s net worth was far less than $45 
million, so the asset freeze effectively 
rendered her broke. 
In the space of a few hours, the federal 
government had accused Luis of a major 
crime and then ensured that she would be 
unable to use her own money to pay lawyers 
to defend her. 
Luis’s lawyers argued that of the $45 million 
in Medicare payments her companies had 
received, she’d retained $4.5 million after 
paying operating costs and other expenses. 
They added that her companies had also 
generated more than $15 million in revenues 
unrelated to any Medicare payments. 
Nonetheless, the judge determined that under 
the civil forfeiture statute, prosecutors were 
entitled to freeze not only tainted assets 
linked directly to the alleged Medicare fraud, 
but also untainted assets that could later be 
substituted in any future forfeiture order if 
Luis was convicted of the Medicare fraud. 
“By freezing even a defendant’s untainted 
assets before trial, the government not only 
cripples a defendant’s ability to retain private 
counsel, but also takes from her the funds she 
would otherwise invest in her defense for the 
best and most industrious investigators, 
experts, paralegals, and law clerks, to at least 
attempt to match the litigation support 
available to the United States Attorney’s 
Office,” her lawyer argued, urging the federal 
judge to reject the government’s freeze 
request. 
The judge disagreed. He issued a restraining 
order, effectively freezing all of Luis’s 
assets.   
Luis appealed the ruling. A panel of the 
Atlanta-based Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the judge’s decision. 
In taking their case to the US Supreme Court, 
lawyers for Luis argue that the lower court 
decisions raise significant constitutional 
issues about the right to obtain counsel in the 
face of aggressive government forfeiture 
tactics. 
“The restraint of untainted assets needed to 
retain counsel poses a serious threat to the 
constitutional right to counsel of choice and 
the balance of forces in a criminal case,” 
Miami lawyer Howard Srebnick writes in his 
petition urging the high court to take up the 
case. 
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“A statute that dispossesses a presumptively 
innocent defendant of her untainted assets 
before trial – denying her the financial ability 
to retain counsel – should be of great concern 
to this court,” he said. 
In response to the petition, US Solicitor 
General Donald Verrilli said the high court’s 
review of the Luis case was unwarranted. 
“A statutorily authorized restraint on a 
defendant’s assets does not violate the 
Constitution if the government has shown 
probable cause to believe that those assets are 
forfeitable,” Mr. Verrilli said. 
The solicitor general said that the high court 
had established in prior cases that there is a 
strong governmental interest in obtaining full 
recovery of federal funds obtained through 
fraud. He said that strong interest “trumps 
any Sixth Amendment interest in permitting 
criminals to use assets adjudged forfeitable to 
pay for their defense.” 
Verrilli said the key distinction is not whether 
assets are tainted or not tainted. The key 
distinction is whether they are forfeitable or 
nonforfeitable, he said. 
He said Luis’s untainted assets could be 
frozen because the judge in the case had 
found probable cause to believe that she had 
spent some of the proceeds of the alleged 
Medicare fraud on luxury items and travel. 
“Petitioner’s desire to spend the substitute 
assets to hire counsel does not trump the 
strong governmental interest in obtaining full 
recovery of all forfeitable assets,” Verrilli 
said. 
“If petitioner’s position were adopted, then a 
defendant could effectively deprive her 
victim of any opportunity for compensation 
simply by dissipating her ill-gotten gains,” he 
said. 
In response, Mr. Srebnick says the 
government has it backward: The Sixth 
Amendment protects the right of a defendant 
to use her untainted assets to hire a lawyer 
without interference from prosecutors 
seeking to render her broke and resourceless 
on the eve of a criminal trial. 
In a friend-of-the-court brief urging the 
justices to take up the case, appellate lawyer 
William Olson said asset forfeiture is 
growing exponentially as an abusive crime-
fighting tool. 
“Asset forfeiture has become the tip of the 
spear wielded by prosecutors against 
Americans in a federal criminal justice 
system designed to extract guilty pleas and 
collect financial awards,” he wrote. 
“Giving the federal government the power to 
seize tainted assets of a defendant ... is a 
fearsome power, but can be understood if the 
assets seized are the fruits of the crime,” he 
said. 
“It is quite another to grant the government 
the power to seize the assets of a defendant 
which are unrelated to the crime,” Mr. Olson 
wrote. 
He said it is unseemly and unjust for the 
government to impoverish those it prosecutes 
in order to disable their defense at trial. 
